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1.1 Goal of this thesis
To indicate the question function of an utterance in natural dialogue, a
speaker may use difFerent cues. For instance, the utterance may begin
with a WH-word (where, what, how, etc.) or an auxiliary verb (did,
can, are, etc.) to indicate a WH-question or a Yes~No-question; this is
exemplified in (1) and (2), respectively.
(1) "What is a declarative question'?"
(2) "Is this a declarative question?"
In such cases, the question function can be determined from syntactic
cues. When natural dialogues are actually examined, however, one may
notice that many questions asked in dialogues have the syntactic form of
a statement, and do not possess one of the overt cues mentioned above.
These questions will be called Dcclarative Questions (DQs). In example
(3), the question function of a DQ is indicated by a question-mark, which,
in spoken dialogues, may correspond with a rising intonation.
(3~ "This is a declarative yuestion'.'"
In natural dialogues, however, a DQ often lacks the final rise in into-
nation and, although hearers usually have no problem in understanding
its question function, it is unknown ~vhich cues are used to disclose the
function of the DQ.
The primary goal in this thesis is to recover how listeners in natural
dialogues identify the question function of a DQ and which information
is conveyed by the speaker if a declarative form is used instead of an
1
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interrogative one. More specifically, we will be concerned with the iden-
tification of the mental state of a speaker in terms of beliefs and intentions
from the linguistic features (prosodic and textual) and the circumstances
(context) of the DQ. For that, we have opted for a combination of em-
pirical observations, experiments, and a theoretical approach: empirical
since we want to know what is actually going on in real discourse, exper-
imental to manipulate the circumstances and to test the hypotheses that
come from the empirical observations, and finally theoretical to model
the identification process of the communicative function of an utterance
and to develop formal methods suitable for use in computer dialogue
systems.
The present research is primarily aimed at the field of speech act the-
ory (Austin (1962); Searle (1969)), although it has gained much from
methods used in different fields of linguistics, such as psycholinguistics
and conversational analyses. In speech act theory, the use of language
is viewed as the performance of actions by a speaker to change certain
aspects of the world. Examples of such actions are `stating', `warning',
`questioning', `promising', etc. In this thesis, speech acts will be con-
sidered as special instances of communicative acts, i.e. acts that are
intentionally meant to transfer certain (linguistic) information. For his-
torical reasons only, we will keep the term `speech act' here; in chapter
6, however, the term `speech act' will be replaced by `communicative
act' to refer explicitly to the conception of an act as a context-changing
function (Gazdar (1981); Bunt (1989a)).
So, the empirical and experimental results will be used to support a
better understanding of speech acts, especially the relation between form
and function (here: `declarative' and `question', respectively) of the ut-
terance in natural dialogue. This presupposes, for instance, that ment.al
states should not be conceived primarily as states in a psychological sense
but rather as logical concepts, with logical interrelations expressed in ax-
iom schemes and rules of inference, to describe the conditions t.hat must
be fulfilled to perform a certain speech act.
To distinguish the syntactic form from the function of the utterance,
we will use the syntactic features declarative and interrogative as op-
posed to the function names statement and queation, respectively. It will
be presupposed that the notion of `declarative' as a syntactic device is
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intuitively clear; no effort will be made to describe the morpho-syntactic
characteristics of the declarative as opposed to other sentence types, such
as interrogative, imperative or exclamative.
1.2 Information dialogues
The type of conversation considered in the present research is restricted
to dialogues. A dialogue in this thesis will be viewed as a real-time
exchange of information between two participants by means of linguistic
tokens. By `real-time' we mean that the time between two consecutive
turns is relatively short, usually no longer than a few minutes. This
also includes keyboard dialogues, where people sometimes take somewhat
longer time to respond to their partner (see e.g., Beun dc Bunt (1987)).
Here, the type of dialogue will be restricted to so-called injormation
dialogues. In information dialogues, participants behave in a rational and
cooperative way and have the sole purpose of transferring factual infor-
mation (Bunt (1989b)). Examples are dialogues with information desks
of airport services, railway stations and task-oriented dialogues such as
described in Grosz and Sidner (1986). The motivation for choosing this
type of dialogue is twofold:
"The scientific reason is that virtually any kind of dialogue de-
pends on the transfer of information. The study of information
dialogues is therefore basic to the study of dialogues in general.
The practical reason is that dialogues, purely motivated by the
aim of transferring factual information, are one of the most ob-
vious forms of cominunication in natural language that make
sense with a computer." (Bunt (1989b): pp. 423)
It was already mentioned that we want to know what is going on in real
discourse. Hence, we want to analyse utterances that people normally use
in the circumstances of an information dialogue rather than made-up ex-
amples emanated from the investigator's intuition. Taking material from
real-life dialogues has two other major advantages. Firstly, the problem
of circularity can be avoided. That is, on the one hand we would like to
determine the question function from the characteristics of the utterance
and, on the other, we want to find out which characteristics are impor-
tant in determining the function. Since the function can be derived from
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the discourse, we can simply pick out those utterances with a declara-
tive sentence type that function as questions in the dialogues, without
bothering beforehand about their characteristics. Secondly, contextual
information usually plays an essential role in determining the question
function; the dialogues (discourse and non-discourse context) enable us
to determine what this information may be.
The dialogues considered in this thesis were taken from a laboratory
experiment where subjects had to determine by telephone departure and
arrival times of aircraft and trains from an informant at Schiphol airport
(Beun (1985)). Before we give a short overview of the research in the
next section, an example of the kind of investigated dialogue is shown
in (4).1 Note that the italicized utterances in lines 8, 10 and 15 are
declarative questions and easily identifiable as such from the discourse
although no question-marks were added.
(4) I- information service, S- subject
1 I: Schiphol Information.
2 S: Good afternoon. This is van I. in Eindhoven. I
would like to have some information about flights to
Munich. When can I fly there between now and next
Sunday?
3 I: Let me have a look. Just a moment.
4 S: Yes.
5 I: O.K., there are three flighta every day, one at
nine fifty,
6 S: Yes.
7 I: one at one forty and one at six twenty-five.
8 S: Six twenty-five . These all go to Munich
9 I: These all go to Munich.
10 S: And that's on Saturday too
11 I: And that's on Saturday too, yes.
'The example is taken from Bunt (1989b); the English translation is a junction of different
dialogues and used to accentuate the occurrence of declarative questions in this type of dialogue.
The original Dutch transcriptions have been collected in Prust, Minnen k Beun (1984).
Inttoduction 5
12 S: Right. Do you also have information about the
connections to Schiphol by train?
13 I: Yes , I do .
14 S: Do you know how long the train ride takes to
Schiphol?
15 I: You are travelling from Eindhoven
16 S: That's right.
1? I: It's nearly two hours to Amsterdam. You can
change there and then it's another fifteen minutes,
so you should count on some two and a half hours.
18 S: O.K. Thank you.
19 I: You're welcome.
20 S: Bye.
21 I: Bye .
1.3 Thesis outline
In the next chapter, we will concentrate on certain issues about the
identification of speech acts and communicative acts in general. Uttering
sentences will be viewed as the intentional performance of actions to
achieve a certain goal of the speaker. To some extent, communication
is based on the notion of conventionality, i.e. a listener may infer from
certain conventional syntactic or semantic structures of the utterance
the function of the utterance. Also, a speaker may use mutually known
protocols applied to cooperative dialogues to communicate information
(e.g., the cooperation principle as formulated by Grice (19ï5)). From
the identification of communicative acts in general, we will descend to
the more specific case of the identification of questions.
In the following chapters we will concentrate on declarative questions.
In chapter 3, two experiments are described where subjects had to iden-
tify the question function from tape-recorded utterances. The first ex-
periment was an exploratory investigation to give an impression of the
main characteristics of DQs. DQs, isolated from the earlier recorded
telephone dialogues, were mixed with isolated answers from the same
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dialogues. In the second experiment, potential question indicators of the
DQs were removed by computer and the original and edited utterances
were both presented to the subjects so that the influence of the removal
of these indicators could be investigated.
A disadvantage of removing textual indicators from the speech sig-
nal is that prosodic features are removed as well. To eliminate prosodic
characteristics and to concentrate on textual indicators only, an experi-
ment is described in chapter 4 where the subjects had to identify a DQ
from screen. In contrast with the previous experiments, the responses
of the subjects could not be directly compared with real-life utterances,
since the utterances were only based on the declarative questions from
the original dialogues.
In chapter 5, an experiment is described where the influence of con-
textual features was tested on the use of DQs in a dialogue situation.
Dialogues, taken from transcriptions of the earlier conversations, were
presented on paper to subjects and information with respect to the se-
mantic content of the questions was manipulated in three ways: 1. the
information could be derived from the previous text literally or by im-
plication, 2. the information was derivable from pragmatic inferences
(implicatures) or 3. the information was not derivable at all from the
previous text. In the experiment, one group of subjects had to indi-
cate preference for a declarative or an interrogative form of the question;
another group had to judge the speaker's certainty about the semantic
content of the declarative.
In chapter 6, a theoretical framework is sketched to identify the beliefs
and intentions of a speaker from the linguistic features of the utterance.
The framework is based on an application of hierarchically ordered de-
fault rules. By such rules, a preferred interpretation of an utterance can
be given in terms of relevant aspects of the mental state of the speaker. A
preferred interpretation can be rejected in cases of inconsistency due to
contextual knowledge of the hearer. In those cases, a hearer may turn to
a less preferred interpretation. For instance, a declarative is interpreted
as a statement unless contextual evidence says otherwise. In the latter
case, a declarative may be interpreted as a question, or, more specifi-
cally, a verification. The framework was worked out in such a manner





The identification of inental states
2.1 Introduction
Since speech acts are considered as instances of communicative acts
(CAs), they will also inherit characteristics from CAs. Here, CAs will
be considered as actions intentionally performed to transfer certain in-
formation from an actor (speaker) to an observer (hearer) and as parts
of a plan to change certain aspects of the world. For instance, if an actor
wants to make inquiries by phone about the departure time of his plane
to San Francisco, he has to develop a plan to obtain the relevant infor-
mation. The plan consists of a number of actions some of which may
be communicative: he has to find out the right. phone number, call the
information desk, talk to the informant, etc. (see e.g., Pollack (1989)).
Intentions play a fundamental role in human communication. Not
only are CAs intentionally performed to transfer certain information,
CAs are also performed in the Gricean sense of non-natural meaning
(meaning-nn: Grice (1957)), i.e.:
An actor meant-nn a by doing a certain C:~ iff:
the actor intended the CA to cause some e(iect cr in the
observer by means of the recognition of that intention.
So, the act.ion of scratching your nose may be performed intentionally to
relieve the itch; however, only when the action is intentionally performed
to cause a certain effect in the observer by recognizing that intentíon will
we speak of the (non-natural) meaning of a certain action. For instance,
in a card game, if the scratching is performed to cause the effect that
the observer knows that the actor has a good card, the meaning of the
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scratching is the intention that the observer recognizes that the action
is performed to communicate that the actor has a good card.
Now, an important question to be answered is how the observable
features of the CA ( such as body movements, words, etc.) can be related
to aspects of the actor's mental state. In other words, how does an
observer recognize from the actor's behaviour the intended information
transfer? Here, we have two options. Firstly, the observer may infer
relevant parts of the actor's mental state from knowledge of a convention
that a particular behaviour has a certain meaning. In that case, the
meaning can be derived from the behaviour itself. Secondly, the meaning
of someone's behaviour can be inferred from situational characteristics.
The same behaviour may have different meanings in different situations
and, on the other hand, difFerent behaviour may have the same meaning
in the same situation. For instance, the act of raising a hand may count
as a`greeting' in one context, and an `appeal for help' in another. And
the act of pointing at the salt cellar may have the same meaning in
the same context as asking "Can you pass me the salt?". So, to derive
the intended information transfer from an actor's behaviour, we have to
describe at least (1) the actor's behaviour, ( 2) conventions regarding the
meaning of a certain behaviour and (3) particular contextual aspects.
To infer the meaning of a certain act, we will concentrate in this chap-
ter on both the behaviour of the actor and some contextual constraints.
5ince we only consider actions that are intentionally performed, we will
first discuss how intentions should be understood in this thesis. Next, we
will elucidate what we mean by the concepts of cooperation and ratio-
nality. And finally, we will narrow the type of act to linguistic acts and
focus attention on speech act theory. In particular will we discuss vari-
ous features that may support a question interpretation of the utterance.
The features of the act in terms of prosodics, lexical items and sentence
structure of the utterance may be conceived as a particular behaviour
of the actor. Rules of cooperation and rationality are supposed to be
perennial information and may therefore be understood as contextual
knowledge of the actor.
The identification of inental states 11
2.2 Intentions
In both Allwood (1976~ and Bratman (1989), a distinction is made be-
tween intentions that are connected to actions and intentions that are
connected to mental states. For instance, an agent may intentionally
pick up the phone and he may have the intention to be in San Francisco
in the future. In the former case the intention characterizes the action,
i.e. the action is purposefully performed to achieve a certain state. In
the latter case, the intention characterizes the agent's mental state, i.e.
the agent's comtnitment to achieve a certain desired world. What is im-
portant here is that the first intention indicates that the action is part
of a plan t.o achieve an intended state and that the second intention can
be considered as a conduct-controlling attitude to direct behaviour to-
wards a certain end. In what follows, we will mainly be concerned with
the latter, although it will be assumed that all actions considered in this
thesis are performed intentionally.
Intention should be carefully distinguished from consciousness and
desires of an actor. We will assume that some actions that are part
of a plan may be carried out consciously, other actions less so or even
unconsciously. However, all actions are carried out intentionally and are
therefore part of a plan to achieve an intended state. For instance, the
actor does not have to be conscious of the way he picks up the phone or
how to move his fingers to dial the number, although these actions are
carried out intentionally, i.e. to achieve the primary goal to know the
departure time of the plane. In the same way a speaker is not conscious of
the way he pronounces words or how he `adds' certain intonation patterns
to his utterances, although the utterances are performed intentionally.
We will assume that the identi6cation of someone's intentions does not
depend on his consciousness.
Cohen ác Levesque (1989a) argue that intentions are related to desires
of an agent but are not reducible to them. An agent may have compet.-
ing desires; intentions, by contrast, are always consistent, i.e. an agent
believes that the state resulting from the performance of his intended
actions is a reachable state. For instance, the agent cannot have the
intention to be at two different places at the same time. However, an
agent may have the desire to be at both places at the same time. Loosely
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speaking, an agent chooses a certain desired state and his decision com-
mits him to execute certain actions to achieve that state. In other words,
intentions make the actor act. Henceforward, we will call the final state
to be achieved the óasic intention of the actor.
2.3 Cooperative behaviour and intentions
The basic intention of an agent, which corresponds with the intended
final result of the agent's plan, is usually difficult to discover. A hearer
may recognize the basic intention if a speaker expresses himself extremely
precisely or completely (which hardly ever happens in conversations) or
when the context is sufficiently restrictive to recognize the intention (e.g.,
when two people know each other very well). Fortunately, the basic
intention need not be recognized in most cases. Let us take an example
to clarify this.
In a dialogue with an information desk at Amsterdam airport, the
information seeker asks what time the plane leaves to New York. Actu-
ally, the speaker's basic intention is to go to San Francisco, but he thinks
that one should take the plane to New York first. The answer of the
informant depends on what he knows about the belief and basic inten-
tion of the speaker and his knowledge about the planes to San Francisco
and New York. The informant may just answer the question, without
paying attention to what the questioner actually wants. The informant
is only more cooperative when he helps the questioner on the way to San
Francisco, for instance, when the informant knows that there is an easier
way to get there.l
Cooperation can be seen as a way of acting such that an agent inten-
tionally helps to fulfill the goals of his partner. In Grice (1975), general
principles underlying the efficient cooperative use of language of rational
agents are identified. The so-called cooperative principle is expressed as
follows:
"Make your contribution such as required, at the stage at which
'[n designing natural language dialogue systems the minimal cooperation required is that
the system answers a question literally or executes a command, but, as may be clear from the
utterance "Delete all information from your data baser, the system cannot be cooperative in
all cases.
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it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk ex-
change in which you are engaged" (pp. 45)
Next, four categories of more specific maxims and submaxims are distin-
guished that yield results in accordance with the cooperative principle:
1. The maxim of quality
Try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:
(i) do not say what you believe to be false
(ii) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence
2. The maxim of quantity
(i) Make your contribution as informative as is required for the
current purpose of the exchange
(ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required
3. The maxim of relevance
Make your contribution relevant
4. The maxim of manner
Be perspicuous, specifically:
(i) avoid obscurity in the expression
(ii) avoid ambiguity
(iii) be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)
(iv) be orderly
Grice suggests that the maxims are not arbitrary conventions but rather
describe rational means for conducting cooperative exchanges and there-
fore have their analogues in rational cooperative non-linguistic behaviour.
In chapter 6 of this thesis the maxims of quantity and quality are
expressed in terms of intentions and beliefs of the speaker. The impor-
tance of the maxims in our case is that from the knowledge about the
way agent.s use language, listeners can make inferences about the mental
state of the speaker. For instance, if a speaker makes a statement and
he acts cooperatively, the hearer knows that the speaker believes the
content of the statement.. Or, if a speaker asks a question, a hearer can
infer by means of the quantity and~or relevance maxim that the speaker
wants to know certain information.
The first quantity maxim also enables a hearer to supply more infor-
mation than is actually asked for, since the current goal is taken into
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account. This may happen, for instance, when the hearer knows the
basic intention of the speaker, although the speaker did not express this
intention. For instance, if a speaker asks "Can you pass the salt?", a
hearer will interpret the utterance primarily as a request to pass the
salt and not as a question concerning the hearer's physical abilities (al-
though both readings may be available). So, from the fact that an actor
acts purposefully and behaves cooperatively, inferences can be generated
that go beyond the semantic content of the utterances; the inferences are
called irraplicatures.
Sufficient restriction of the situation enables the hearer to infer rel-
evant parts of the mental state from the speaker's actions. Here, we
should be careful, though, because there is a snake in the grass. Specifi-
cally, how should the speaker's action be described? Previously, we used
the examples `statement' and 'question', but, since speakers hardly ever
explicitly mention these functions, the hearer has to find the information
from other features in the utterance. So, before the action can be deter-
mined, we have to describe the observable features conventionally tied to
a certain action. In what follows, we will concentrate on the recognition
of speech acts, more specifically of questions, and keep in mind that all
features can be overruled by contextual aspects. First, we will briefly
introduce some general aspects and terminology of speech act theory.
2.4 Speech act theory
In speech act theory (Austin (1962); Searle ( 1969)), it is assumed that
utterances not only can be assigned a truth value, but that utterances
also change the world by doing something. For instance, declaratives
like:
"I warn you that this dog will bite"
"I promise you to come"
"I ask you to leave"
"I hereby pronounce you man and wife"
do not describe a certain state of affairs, but are used to perform certain
actions. Such sentences and their main verbs are called performatives and
performative verós, respectively. Although the sentences cannot be true
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or false, they can be infelicitous,z i.e. certain conditions can be absent
that must be met before the performative can be successfully carried
out. These conditions are called the felicity conditions, i.e. the necessary
conditions to perform a certain act. In many cases, performatives can
only be perforined felicitously if particular institutional arrangements are
present. iVot only must the speaker have certain beliefs and intentions,
the circumst.ances must also be appropriate. Simply saying "I hereby
christen the ship New Magic Breeze" cannot count as naming a ship
without the presence of a ship, a bottle of champagne, witnesses, an
appropriate person chosen to name it, etc.
.Austin claimed that, in uttering a sentence, three kinds of acts are
simultaneously performed: the locutionary, the illocutionary and the per-
locutionary act. The locutionary act is the production of a sentence with
a particular sense and reference.3 The illocutionary act is the perfor-
mance of a certain act by virtue of the conventional force associated
with it, e.g., `stating', `promising', `warning', etc. The perlocutionary
act is what is achieved by performing the act, i.e. the bringing about of
certain effects on the listener, such as `convincing', `scaring', etc.
The focus of Austin's theory lies in the second act, which is also called
the speech act. With every illocutionary act, an illocutionary force can
be associated that explicitly names the type of act performed. For in-
stance, if, in the appropriate circumstances, a speaker utters the sentence
"The dog is in the house", the illocutionary force may be: `stating' or
`warning'; the perlocutionary effects may be: `convincing' or `scaring'.
The illocutionary acts are supposed to be conventional and the perlocu-
tionary acts are specific to the circumstances of the utterance. However,
there are certain problems associated with the word `conventional', since
the illocutionary forces above are not independent of the circumstances,
and the only cases where we can speak of a convent.ional force are the
institutionalized performatives like `christening', `declaring', etc. An-
other problem is that. declaratives cannot simply be tied to statements,
interrogatives to questions and imperatives to orders or requests and it
-It can be argued, however, that these sentences are true after they aze uttered and false
before. But even when this is so, it is obvious that the world has changed.
'Actually, Austin distinguishes the phonelic act (i.e. the act of making sound), the phatic
act (i.e. uttering words with a certain grammar and intonation) and the rhetic act (uttering a
sentence with certain sense and reference).
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is rertainlv not clear how other utterance features can be linked to the
act nal illocutionary act performed. We will return to this problem later
on.
A second important contribution to the theory of speech acts comes from
Searle (1969). Searle's account of speech act theory can be considered
a~ an elaboration of Austin's work, especially on the felicity conditions
(FCs) of the illocutionary act. Although Searle accepts the same termi-
nology, he does not distinguish in the same way between the illocutionary
and locutionary act. 5earle takes the term propositional act as referring
to Austin's act of referring and predicating. Now, the illocutionary act
is rewritten as a function, the illocutionary force, and its argument, the
propositional content. For instance, the utterance "Is John sleeping?"
may have the force of `questioning' and the content `SLEEP(John~'; the
illocutionary act is represented as `Question(SLEEP(John)~'.
Searle suggests a classification of FCs into four types: propositional
content, preparatory, sincerity and essential conditions. Let us clarify
the classification with an example: the illocutionary act of `questioning'
(5earle (1969): pp. 66).
S - speaker, H - hearer
Propositional content: can be any proposition or propositional
function
Preparatory: 1. S does not know the answer
2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H
will provide the information at that time
without being asked
Sincerity: S wants the information
Essential: Counts as an attempt to elicit the informa-
tion from H
5earle argues that there are two kinds of questions, a. real questions and
b. exam questions; in the first the speaker wants to find out the answer
and in the latter the speaker wants to find out whether the listener knows
the answer. Note that in the latter case, the first preparatory condition
would not be fulfilled, hence, either the conditions are too restrictive or
the exam question is no real question in Searle's view.
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In this thesis, a question is primarily taken as a signal from a speaker
t.o a hearer that the speaker wants certain information. To some ex-
tent, this definition agrees with a combination of Searle's sincerity and
essential conditions on questioning. In Searle's essential condition it is
explicitly mentioned that the question should be seen as an attempt to
elicit information from H. In our view, the information may come from
anywhere, but will most likely corne from H, because H acts coopera-
tively, and the speaker is aware of 1I's cooperative behaviour. Note that
in the case of the exam question, the speaker explicitly wants the infor-
mation to come from the hearer. This situation, though, falls outside
the scope of the inforrnation dialogue. In chapter 6, we will see that
the first preparatory condition can be inferred from rules of rational
behaviour combined with the sincerit,y condition. Levinson (1983) also
suggests that the FCs will probably follow from general considerations
of cooperation and rationality.
In line with Cohen 8c Levesyue (19896), we will take the view that
illocutionary forces need not be explicitly recognized by a hearer. This
may sound contradictory, as this thesis is about the identification of
questions. However, illocutionary forces will be considered as labels of
parts of the speaker's mental state. The hearer only has to identify the
speaker's beliefs and intentions from the observable properties of the
utterance, such as `declarative', `rising intonation', etc., and may omit
the explicit determination of the illocutionar,y force in terms of perfor-
mative verbs. The speaker's mental state will be expressed in terms of
sets of propositions qualified by the attitudes `Belief' (B) and `Intention'
(I), built into a logical framework with the appropriate axioms. An im-
portant advantage of this approach is that the Gricean maxims can be
brought within the logical framework and that the felicity conditions are
not linked to a particular illocutionary force but are subject to general
rules of rationalit,y and cooperative behaviour.
Illocutionary acts will be considered in a Searlean sense, i.e. the ap-
plication of the illocutionary force as a function to its argument, the
propositional content. For that reason. the term `illocutionary force'
will, in most cases, be replaced by `communicative function' (CF), and
also `illocutionary act' will be replaced by `communicative act' to refer
to the conception of an action intentionally performed to change certain
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aspects of the world (see also Bunt (1989a)).
2.4.1 The identification of speech acts
Turning now to the identification of an illocutionary act, we should con-
sider the conventions to express a certain act. It should be noted, though,
that we are not concerned with what is linguistically correct, since the
data discussed in the following chapters comes from human behaviour
in dialogues, not from what linguists consider as correct or relevant con-
ventional usage.
The most overt linguistic indicator of the illocutionary force is the
(sincere) use of an explicit performative,4 like:
"I hereby ask you what time it is"
"I hereby confirm my reservations"
"I hereby check whether John has gone"
However, explicit performatives are seldom used. Austin discusses other
features, apart from situational aspects, that may also indicate a partic-
ular illocutíonary force:
Mood: By mood Austin refers to what we will call sentence type, e.g.,
`declarative', `interrogative' and `imperative'. Some examples are:5
sentence type example illocutionary force
Declarative "John drinks beer" statement
Interrogative "Does John drink beer" question
Imperative "Drink beer, John" order
Tone of voice, cadence, emphasis: Henceforth, these features will
be called `prosodics'. In written language they may be replaced by
punctuation, it.alics, etc. One has to be careful, though, especially
in transcriptions of spoken dialogues, where question-marks often
indicate the utterance' function., and not its prosodic characteris-
tics. Some examples are:
'The explicit performative is not decisive in all cases. For instance, in the appropriate
circumstances, the utterance "I promise you that I will return" can be meant as a`warning',
and not as a sincere act of 'promising'.
SFor a discussion on the relation between sentence type and illocutionary force, see e.g.,
Geukens (1986).
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prosodics example ill. force
final fall "There is a dog in the house." statement
final rise "There is a dog in the house?" question
accentuation "There is a DOG in the house!" warning
Connecting particles: Austin discusses some particles that may re-
place the use of an explicit. performative. For instance, the particle
`still' indicates `I will insist that'; `therefore' and `so' indicate `I
conclude that', ctc.
Accompaniments of the utterance: L7tterances may be accompa-
nied by non-verbal phenomena, like gestures (winks, pointing,
frowning, etc.) or ceremonial non-verbal activities.
2.4.2 The identification of questions
In Clark 8c Clark (1977) the following syntactic strategy is described to
identify the function of a clause in a sentence from its first constituent:
"Use the first word (or major constituent) of a clause to identify
the function of that clause in the current sentence." (pp. 68)
So, if the main clause begins with a W H-word, it is a WH-question.
Whenever a clause begins with an auxiliary verb (in English) it is a
Yes~No-question. An exception of the WH-word is formed by `exclama-
tives', like "What a beautiful launderette he has!"; in such cases, how-
ever, the clause has no subject-verb inversion. However, the following
examples can hardly be considered as sincere acts of questioning:
(1) "What did you say? Peter crashed my car. I can't, believe it."
It is not difficult to 6nd other counter-examples where the main clause
starts with an auxiliary:
(2) "Don't I know what a carburettor is? I'll teach you."
(3) "May I remind you that we have to leave early?"
(4) "Didn't you forget to close the door?"
Z~ Chapter 2
In (1) and (2) the speaker does not fulfill any of the felicity conditions
suggested by Searle and the yuestion can be interpreted as rhetorical.
In (3) the speaker asks literally whether he may remind the hearer that
they have to leave early. However, the speaker does not await the answer,
hence the sincerity and the essential conditions are not fulfilled (see also
Levinson (1983)). And the utterance in (4) may simply count as an
indirect request by the speaker to close the door.
We may hope that in spoken dialogues information about the question
function of the utterance comes frotn prosodics. However, this hope is
often vain. Geluykens (1988) has shown that (at least in British English)
in many cases intonation is not used to distinguish sincere questions from
interrogatives without question status. Even in cases where a declarative
sentence type was used (DQs), a falling intonation pattern was by far
the most frequent pattern (68~). Our findings confirm this for Dutch.
Hence, it is to be expected that a simple form-force correlation does not
exist and that the utterances' function is heavily influenced by contextual
features.
Chapter 3
The auditory recognition of
declarative questions
R.J. Beun
~A slightly revised version o)` this chapter was accepted in: Taylor, M.M., F. Néel f!
D.G. Bouwhuis (Eds.~ (1989J The structure oj multimoda! dialogue. Amsterdam: North
Hollcnd~
abstract
In this paper two experiments are presented on the recognition of questions with a
declarative sentence type (DQs) in Dutch. DQs were isolated from previously recorded
telephone dialogues and mixed with answers. In the first experiment subjects had to
determine from audio tape the function (answer or question) of the isolated utterances.
The second experiment was carried out to determine the indicators which played a
decisive role in the responses of the subjects. To this end, possible question indicators
were removed from the utterances and subjects were asked to perform the same task as
in the previous experiment. It followed that important question indicators were given
by the pragmatic particles such as en (and) and dus (so). A substantial part of the
questions in isolation could not be labelled with the correct function; it is concluded that




In general it is assumed that questions in natural language are repre-
sented by sentences with an interrogative sentence type (example la).1 In
natural dialogues, however, one finds many utterances with a declarative
sentence type which clearly fulfill the function of a question.z Sometimes
these utterances have clear cues to indicate this function, e.g. the use
of special words (example lb) or, as indicated by the question mark in
(Ic). a rising intonation at the end of the utterance in spoken language:
(la) "Are you invited to the party?" (interrogative)
(lb~ "So, you are invited to the party." (declarative)
(lc) "You are invited to the party?" (declarative)
Although we will not consider the exact contribution of the indicators
to the function, one can roughly say that the word so in (lb) and the
combination of declarative sentence type and rising intonation in (lc)
not only seem to express the question as in (la) but also a speaker's
supposition about the answer.
In many cases clear indicators are absent and the determination of
the function seems to come from contextual cues only. The recognition
of questions (and of course answers) is of crucial importance for a proper
continuation of the dialogue; so we would like to find special character-
istics in the utterance which could indicate its question function even in
the absence of contextual cues.
We will use the theoretical framework of Bunt's communicative acts
(Bunt (1989a)). In doing so we have restricted ourselves to so-called in-
Jormation dia.logves in which the participants have no other purpose than
the exchange of factual information. A communicative act is determined
bv the combination of its semantic content and its communicative func-
tion (CF). This function stipulates the role of the semantic content in the
dialogue and relates it to the speaker's knowledge and goals. The CF of
the utterances in (lb) and (lc) for example is a CHECK with semantic
1Following Gazdar (1981) we will regard sentence type as a purely syntactic characteristic
of sentences.
zHere an utterance should be taken in the sense of a sentence paired with a context (see e.g.
Levinson (1983): pp. IS-19, or Gazdar (1981)).
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content INVITED(H,party) where H is the hearer of the utterance. In
terms of knowledge and goals the preconditions of these utterances are
respectively:
(2a) S wants to know whether INVITED(H,party)
(2b~ 5 suspects (or knows) that H knows whether INVITED(H,party~
(2c~ S suspects that INVITED(H,party)
In this paper we present an experimental study of questions with a
declarative sentence type in natural dialogues. Subsequently, two experi-
ments were carried out to find out whether subjects are able to recognize
the CF of utterances detached from the context. The utterances were
obtained in previous dialogue experiments which will not be considered
here (see Beun (1985)).j As discourse situation we used the information
exchange b,y telephone4 concerning arrival and departure times of planes
and trains at 5chiphol (Amsterdam airport). The dialogues will be called
`Schiphol dialogues'.
3.2 The corpus of utterances
All utterances investigated in this paper are declarative questions (DQs~,
i.e. questions, but with a declarative sentence type. Both complete and
elliptical utterances are considered. Since in the case of elliptical utter-
ances it is difficult and sometimes impossible to determine the sentence
type, only those instances with clear interrogative or imperative features
were excluded from the corpus.
To determine if an utterance is a question, even in the absence of
syntactic indicat.ions. the following definition is used:
DEF An utterance U is a declarative question if:s
'Dutch speaking subjects had to determine by telephone the departure and arrival times of
airplanes and trains from an informant. at Schiphol airport. The informant was simulated by
a well-trained person. Each subject read eight sets of instructions to tell them what kind of
iníormation had to be obtained
aHere we avoid non-verbal aspects of communication which are difhcult to measure such
as eye-contact, body-movement, etc.; so everything can be collected from the original speech
signal.
SThe interpretation of sentences defined by DEF as a question also agrees with the maxim
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a. The sentence type of the sentence expressed by U is declarative
(or if the sentence is elliptical the sentence type is at least non-
interrogative and non-imperative).
b. The utterance U, uttered by S, is about a topic on which S believes
that H is the expert.
c. S believes that S and H mutually believe that H is the expert on the
topic.~
Note that we have excluded sentences as:
(3) "I want to know what time it is"
(4) "Can you tell me what time it is"
The reason is that (3) is not a direct question as far as the literal interpre-
tation is involved: in (3) the literal topic is the goal of the speaker, who
is the expert on his own goals. (4) is excluded because of its interrogative
sentence type.
In many cases where a matrix sentence contains a performative
verb
in the second person, past tense, the definition is satisfied,~ e.g.:
(5) "You said that. the plane will ]eave at ten"
(6) "You stated that the Germans will win"
For, in the restricted domain we use here, the addressee knows best what
he has said, stated, etc. The same can be said about epistemic or doxastic
verbs in the second person, present or past tense, e.g.:
(7) "You mean that I have to leave at ten"
of quantity, for if the addressee knows more about the subject than
the speaker (and this is
mutually believed) the utterance would be superfluous in the case of a statement.
~`S and H mutually believe that p-(q) S and H believe that p and
that q'. See also Clark
and Marshall (198I).
'In special circumstances one can use these forms to focus certain aspects
of an addressee's
knowledge or actions to introduce for instance counterexamples, e.g.:
"You stated that indirect speech acts can be explained by means of
felicity condi-
tions, but how then do you explain the utterance "It's cold inside" as a request
to
close the window."
We did not encounter any of these examples in our restricted domain.
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(8) "You think that I'm joking"
Again, the addressee knows best what, he means, thinks, etc. In the
next sentence, however, it is not clear what the CF is without contextual
knowledge:
(9) "The train leaves at 12.00"
Uttered by an informant in the dialogue experiments the CF can be an
answer, uttered by one of the subjects the CF can be a DQ,B even without
a rising intonation at the end. In fact only 48~ (37 out of 77) of the DQs
which appeared in the dialogue experiments had a rising intonation.
DEF is largely based on contextual characteristics such as topic and
mutual belief. We expected however that certain characteristics of the
utterances (prosodic or textual) could indicate the CF without the use
of context. F'rom a linguistic angle one can think of the use of special
words such as so, thus, etc.`~ Prosodic cues could for instance be given
by intonation, accentuation or declination. To find out whether these
indicators contribute to the interpretation of the CF we carried out the
experiments described in the following sections.
3.3 The first experiment
From the Schiphol dialogues we isolated 77 declarative questions (DQs).lo
Forty seven utterances were excluded from the experiment because the
`DQ indicators' were so clear that it was feared that the subjects would
only pay attention to these clear cases to distinguish the CF.11 These
clear indicators were: 1. rising intonation at the end of the utterance
(37 utterances), 2. the use of Dutch particles such as: hè, toch, zeker (13
utterances) and 3. t.he use of special verbs as described in the previous
section (6 utterances). Some utterances possessed two or more of these
indicators. The remaining 30 DQs were mixed with 24 answers, which
were also taken from the Schiphol dialogues.
BStrictly speaking a DQ is not a communicative function because it contains syntactic infor-
mation; this characterization is only maintained for the sake of simplicity.
~In Dutch these partides are widely used in natural dialogues, e.g. wel, toch, dus, en, ook,
etc.
"' We had no problems with interruptions because the voices of the informant and the subject
were recorded on different tracks. (TEAC A3440 4-channel simul-sync)
"At this moment this is just a supposition and still has to be tested.
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The task of the subjects was divided into two parts; in one part they
had to indicate for each utterance whether it was a question or not
(question task), in the other part they had to say whether the utterance
was an answer or not (answer task).12 The subjects did not know (before
and after the experiment) that in both cases the same utterances were
used.
This first experiment was only meant to give a rough indication about
the ability of subjects to recognize the CF in general, so only six Dutch
subjects (of both sexes, all over 18) took part in the first experiment.
They had to write down their responses on paper and they could think
about their responses as long as they wanted.
Before we discuss the results we will introduce some abbreviations. To
distinguish the original CF (known from the context) from the responses
given by the subjects we will always write the first one in capital letters.
The responses of the subjects will be divided into 4 parts:
(yes)question: the utterance is interpreted as a question in the ques-
tion task.
(no~question: the utterance is interpreted as not being a question in
the question task.
(yes~answer: the utterance is interpreted as an answer in the answer
task.
(no)answer: the utterance is interpreted as not being an answer in the
answer task.
If the subjects agreed in more than 90~ of the cases on a question as
CF of an utterance (percentage of both (yes)questions and (no)answers
~ 90070), the utterances were called `Q-utterances'. Conversely if the
subjects agreed on an answer in more than 90~, the utterances were
called 'A-utterances'. (Note that this has nothing to do with the orig-
inal CF.) Responses are called `inconsistent' if a subject interpreted the
same utterance as (yes)answer and (yes)question or as (no)answer and
(no)question.
~~Actually the subjects also had to answer whether the utterance was an `inform'
(Dutch:
'mededeling'). We did not investigate these results, so they are omitted.
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3.4 Results
70~ (199 out of 285)13 of the ANSWERs and 69~ (242 out of 351) of the
DQs were correctly identified. (Note that 50~ would be purely random.)
By `correctly identified' we mean that, if the utterance was a DQ, the
subjects responded: (yes)question and (no)answer, and vice versa if the
utterance was an ANSWER. 11~ of the ANSWERs and 12~ of the
DQs were identified inconsistently, so there were no striking differences
between the ANSWERs and DQs.
These results do not look very spectacular. When we consider every
utterance separately, however, some interesting results appear. Table
3.1 shows the number of utterances as a function of the CF and the
percentage of correct responses per utterance. The maximum number of
correct responses per utterance is 12, i.e. the total number of responses
of the subjects per utterance in both answer and question task.
Table 3.1: Number of utterances as a function of the orig-
inal CF and the percentage correct responses per utterance.
DQ
ANSWER
correct responses per utterance







From Table 3.1 it can be seen that 19 (17 f 2) DQs were not correctly
identified, which agrees almost 25~ of the total number of DQs in the
dialogues. Also, in 19 (11 f 8) cases the subjects could almost perfectly
identify the CF (both DQ and ANSWER), in 3(2 ~- 1) cases the CF
is inverted (ANSWER -~ Q-utterance, DQ --~ A-utterance) and in 32
(17 f 15) cases the subjects could hardly identify the CF. Note that the
first and the last column, i.e. the percentage of correct responses 1 90~
and G 10~, respectively, shows the number of Q- and A-utterances.
But how do subjects identify the Q- and A-utterances? In other words,
what special characteristics do these utterances have to reveal the CF?
To discover this, all Q- and A-utterances were analysed on intonation
"In some cases subjects did not make any decision at all, so the total numbers of ANSWERs
and DQs differ from 12 x 24 - 288 and 12 x 30 - 36o respectively.
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patterns but no special differences appeared between these utterances.la
However, there seemed to be an important difference in the use of special
words. Almost all Q-utterances contained particles like en (and)15 at
the beginning of the utterance, dus (so), ook ( also), etc. These words
were missing in the A-utterances. In Table 3.2 the occurrence of special
words is shown for the Q- and A-utterances. Uncertainty was expressed
by words as ongeveer, pak em beet, etc. (about, roughly, etc.) or the
pause-particle uh.
Table 3.2: Occurrence of indicators as a function
of Q-and A-utterances
indicator
dus ' en ook uncertainty ~
Q-utterance 5 6 4 4
A-utterance 0 0 0 2
Note that in Table 3.2 the use of Q- and A-utterances, instead of DQ
and ANSWER, implies that the subjects agreed in more than 90~ on the
interpretation of the CF, and does not imply that the subject's responses
were correct.
These indicators can also be used in answers; so we had the impression
that prosodic aspects also contributed to the interpretation of the CF.
In the second experiment, described in the next section, these linguistic
indicators were removed from the utterances.
3.5 The second experiment
In the second experiment we used the following utterances (total 33)
from the previous one:
1. all Q-utterances (11 utterances)
"We have one DQ, however, where all the subjects responded correctly, with an unusual,
very horizontal declination line. This could be an indication, but because of the Iack of other
examples any conclusion oï this sort seems to be premature.
'`'The English translations are only meant as a general indication about the meaning.
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2. all A-utterances (8 utterances)
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3. utterances with the following characteristics (26 utterances):
a. The appearance of the word en (and) and oh at the beginning
of the utterance.
b. The appearance of the pragmatic particles dus (so), ook (also)
and niet (not).
c. The appearance of the pause particle v,h.
d. Mistakes followed by self-repair.
e. Words which indicate uncertainty.
In most cases, the Q- and A-utterances possessed one or more of the char-
acteristics from (3). Next, these characteristics were removed from the
utterancesl~ and the 33 original utterances were mixed with the edited
ones. Almost the same conditions were applied as in the first experiment;
only the number of utterances (total number was 72 of which 39 were
edited) differed. Where the utterances had two or more of these charac-
teristics (11 utterances) they were removed in arbitrary order to avoid
an exponential growth of the number of these particular utterances. For
example, an utterance with three characteristics would give 7(- 23 - 1)
edited versions; we did not include all combinations but only an arbitrary
selection, e.g.:
(10) "And uh.. these are all coming~ going to Munich" (original)
(l0a) "And these are all coming~ going to Munich" (edited: 3c)
(lOb) "These are all coming~going to Munich" (edited: 3a)
(lOc) "These are all going to Munich" (edited: 3d)
In the second experiment 20 subjects took part.
'~First the utterances were entered in the VAX computer and next the special words were
removed with the sid of the [PO speecó soítware. This could be done with an accuracy of 25
milliseconds. Some of the utterances (but only very few) sounded a little unnatural; none of
the subjects, however, noticed this.
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3.6 Results






en dus uh niet ook oh repair uncert
n- 220 180 80 20 40 20 80 120
Figure 3.1: The percentage of (yes)answers as a function of the pres-
ence (shaded rectangle) and the absence (white rectangle) of special
indicators.
Figure 3.1 shows the difference in (yes)answers to utterances with
(shaded rectangle) and without (white rectangle) special indicators. I~TOte
the considerable variation in the number of utterances per indicator (-
number of responses (n) divided by 20). Figure 3.2 shows the same for
(yes)questions.
In Figure 3.1 we can see for instance that 35~ of the utterances with
indicator en (and) at the beginning were interpreted as an answer. The
same utterances without en are interpreted as an answer in 55~ of the
cases. If we turn to Figure 3.2 we can see that in 64~ of the cases with
en the utterances are interpreted as a question and 51~ when the en is
removed.
The removal of the indicators en, dus and oh had a significant efFect in
both answer and question task ( in all cases: XdJ-1 ~ 4.00, p G 0.05); in
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~ without indicator ~ with indicator
en dus uh niet ook oh repair uncert
nz 220 180 79 20 40 20 80 120
Figure 3.2: The percentage of (yes)questions as a function of the
presence (shaded rectangle) and the absence (white rectangle) of special
indicators.
the other cases no significant effects occurred ( in all cases: XdJ-1 G 1.23,
p J 0.27).
Note that Figures 3.1 ác 3.2 do not have to be complements, be-
cause responses to the same utterance by the same subject can be
(no)question and (no)answer ( 12~, or 166 out of 1440) or (yes)question
and (yes)answer (10~, or 149 out of 1440).
3.7 Discussion
From Table 3.1 it can be seen that the subjects were able to recognize the
CF ín 35~ (19 out of 54) of the cases; in 4~ ( 3 out of 54) the function
was inverted. Table 3.2 shows that important indicators to recognize the
question function can be the word en at the beginning of the utterance,
and the words ook and dus. These words were missing in the utterances
g2 Chapter 3
which were recognized as answers. When these words were removed from
the Q-utterances they never shifted to A-utterances completely, so other
characteristics must be involved in the interpretation.
We will now consider some of the indicators separately.
En at the beginning of the utterance: In Figure 3.1. we can see
that the removal of the word en is of consequence for the interpre-
tation of the CF. When the en is not removed, the subjects prefer
the `question' interpretation (35~ (yes)answer, 64q (yes)question).
When the en is cut out, the responses shift to an `answer' inter-
pretation (55~ (yes)answer, 51~ (yes)question). Note that the
(yes)answers and (yes)questions are independent because they were
given in different tasks. Here it is to be expected that the influence
of prosodic aspects will be very small because the en was never ac-
centuated and forms only a small part of the speech signal of the
complete utterance.
Dus : In this case the shift from question responses (21q (yes)answer,
77~ (yes)question), when dus is included, to answer responses (59~
(yes)answer, 38~ (yes)question), when dus is removed, is rather
dramatic. In this case too, the word was never accentuated; so it
can be expected that the prosodic effects will be very small and that
the shift is mainly caused by its textual meaning.
Oh: Again we see a dramatic shift from question responses (40~
(yes)answer, 60~ (yes)question), when oh is included, to answer re-
sponses (95~ (yes)answer, 5~ (yes)question) when oh is removed.
Note however that in this case we had only one utterance (number
of responses- 20) and the CF of the original utterance was an AN-
SWER. The shift can be explained by the fact that in Dutch the oh
at the beginning is often used to express surprise about the content
of a previous statement and in many cases is followed by an utter-
ance which asks for an explanation. In this case the oh was uttered
because the subject in the dialogue experiment had not expected
the previous question from the informant, because he did not pay
attention to her. So, the particle had nothing to do with the content
of the question.
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Ook and niet: Although the removal of these particles had no signifi-
cant effect, in both cases the interpretation shifts from question to
answer.
When ook is included: 45~ (yes)answer and 60~ (yes)question.
When ook is removed: 52~ (yes)answer and 43~ (yes)question.
When niet is included: 45~ (yes)answer and 55~ (yes)question.
When niet is removed: 65~ (yes)answer and 47~ (yes)question.
Semantically these words seem to contribute little to the CF. An
explanation for the shift can possibly be found in the prosodic prop-
erties of the words. Both words were accentuated and the removal
of the accents could have influenced the responses of the subjects.
The insertion of repair sequences, the expression of uncertainty and the
use of the pause particle uh did not change the responses significantly,
so these indicators do not. seem to contribute to the interpretation of the
CF.
3.8 Conclusion
To determine the question function of a declarative utterance, one can
concentrate on linguistic cues in the utterance and on contextual cues
from the discourse situation. In this paper we have concentrated on the
first category, both prosodic and textual cues.
It was found that only 48~ of the DQs in dialogues possessed a rising
intonation and that in other cases question indicators may come from
Dutch pragmatic particles such as en, dus and oh. `Easy cases' to de-
termine the question function, such as rising intonation, the use of the
particles hè, toch and zeker and the use of verbs like mean and say were
excluded from our experiments and their influence still has to be tested.
In almost 25~ of the cases the DQ could not be identified from either
prosodic or textual cues; so, question cues could only be provided by the
context.
An important shortcoming in the analysis is that the removal of par-
ticular words has the consequence of cutting out certain prosodic aspects
as well. We expect to solve this problem in a following experiment in
which the utterances will be presented on a screen.
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The visual recognition of
declarative questions
R.J. Beun
~A slightly revised version oJ this chapter has been accepted Jor publication in: Journa!
oJ Pragmatics~
abstract
In this paper it is discussed how questions in Dutch with a declarative sentence type
can be recognized in isolation and in natural dialogue. Declarative questions were taken
from telephone dialogues where subjects tried to get information from an information
clerk at Amsterdam airport. In previous experiments these questions were isolated
from the original context and presented on tape to subjects together with a number of
answers. A disadvantage of this method is that it is difficult to distinguish the influence
of prosodic indicators from that of textual ones. Here, an experiment is described
where utterances were presented on a screen to eliminate prosodic characteristics and
to concPntrate on textual indicators only. In the interpretation by the subjects of the
declarative as a question the presence of certain pragmatic particles will be shown to
play a decisive role.
4.1 Introduction
Two important aims in speech act theory are (1) to describe how illo-
cutionary acts can change the mental state of agents over time and (2)
to relate the syntactic and semantic features of utterances to the illocu-
tionary act that is performed.
as
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In many Artificial Intelligence approaches the burden is placed on the
development of theories which describe the effects of utterances on the
mental states of agents participating in a dialogue in terms of beliefs,
knowledge, and intentions (see e.g., Cohen dc Levesque (1989b), Perrault
(1989), Bunt (1989a)). The precise role of certain syntactic and seman-
tic features in contributing to the speech act is usually limited to the
sentence types declarative, imperative, and interrogative or sometimes
totally neglected. If we assume that the production of utterances with
particular features reveals particular aspects of the mental state of the
speaker, then we have to know precisely what features and what aspects.
We will assume that parts of a mental state can be communicated by the
performance of a certain illocutionary act and presume that the act is ob-
tained from the application of the illocutionary force (IF) to its semantic
contentl (Searle (1969), Gazdar (1981), Bunt(1989a)). In this paper, the
determination of the act will be restricted to the identification of the IF.
We will try to answer the question as to which indicators are potential
candidates in the identification and how these indicators correlate with
the IF of the utterance in a specific case.
Austin has already argued (Austin (1962): pp. 76) that the circum-
stances of the utterance are "an exceedingly important aid" in the recog-
nition of the IF. Indicators in the utterance itself can be divided into
two classes: prosodic and textual indicators. Possible indicators in the
prosodic class can be accentuation, declination and special intonatáon
patterns (see e.g., Hadding 8c Studdert-Kennedy (1974), Thorsen (1980),
Geluykens (1987)). Textual cues are, for instance, sentence type and
special pragmatic particles (see e.g., van Dijk (1977), Berenst (1978),
Abraham (1984)).
We will concentrate here on the information available in the utterance
itself, especially its textual features. The sentence type of the utterances
will be restricted to a declarative one and only those indicators will be
considered that contribute to a question force of the declarative in natural
dialogue. We will call these utterances declarative questions (DQs).
In some cases special characteristics are attached by the speaker to
a DQ to indicate its question force; in other cases the question force
`We use the term aemantic content or content instead of the often used propoaitional content
(see Bunt (1989a): pp. 59).
The visual recognition of declarative questions 37
is indicated by contextual cues only. The following simulated dialogues
illustrate this point:
1. (a) A: ... Can you tell me what time the KL402 leaves from
Schiphol airport and what time my sister has to leave from
Eindhoven by train to catch her plane in time?
(b) B: The plane leaves at 12.30, she has to check in one hour before
and the trip from Eindhoven to Schiphol takes about one and
a half hours.
(c) A: So, she has to leave around 9.45 from Eindhoven?
(d) B: Yes.
(e) A: Thank you very much.
It is not difficult to think of an example where utterance 1(c) is used
without the question force:
2. (a) A: ... Can you tell me what time the KL402 leaves from
Schiphol airport and what time my sister has to leave from
Eindhoven by train to catch her plane in time?
(b) B: The plane leaves at 12.30, she has to check in one hour before
and the trip from Eindhoven to Schiphol takes about one and
a half hours. So, she has to leave around 9.45 from Eindhoven.
(c) A: Thank you very much.
Clearly, the italicized utterances in 1(c) and 2(b) have different forces,
although their surface structure and content are identical. Note that
the punctuation marks in both utterances do not have to correspond
to prosodic cues. Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech 8c Svartvik (1972) state
that the question in 1(c) is similar in force to tag questions and that
the final rising tone suggests that the speaker takes the answer yes as a
foregone conclusion. In Dutch, however, (and probably also in English)
the utterance often lacks the final rise in natural spoken conversation
(Beun (1989)).
To determine the force indicators of a DQ we have opted for an em-
pirical method, where people were asked to decide whether a declarative
was a question or an answer.l To exclude contextual dependency of the
'-The actual experiment was slightly more complicated; we will return to thia in section 4.4.
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responses of the subjects as much as possible, the utterances were taken
from a fixed, relatively simple domain of discourse, namely telephone di-
alogues about the arrival and departure times of planes and trains from
Amsterdam airport.
Before we discuss the experiment and its results in sections 4 and 5
respectively, some attention should be devoted to how declaratives can be
understood as questions in natural dialogue. In section 4.2 we will sketch
how DQs can be picked out from the dialogues. In section 4.3 the most
striking question markers in the recorded dialogues will be considered
and the results of previous auditory experiments will be summarized.
4.2 The notion of declarative question
The notion of literal force subscribes to the idea that illocutionary force
is built into sentence form (see e.g., Levinson (1983)). This means that,
unless the sentence possesses explicit performative properties, a declara-
tive is meant for stating something, an interrogative for questioning and
an imperative for ordering or requesting. So, the notion of literal force
suggests a strong relation between sentence type and function of the ut-
terance. Any usage of a sentence not in accordance with the previous
notion is considered to be indirect.
Here, we will avoid the problem whether the declaratives discussed
in this paper are direct or indirect and consider declarative as a purely
syntactic feature of the sentence (see also Gazdar (1981)). From the set
of declarative utterances in the dialogues, it is possible to select a subset
that functions as questions by a rule concerning the beliefs of the dialogue
participants as to who is the expert on the topic of the utterance.
A precise definition of a declarative sentence is hard to give. Should
we, for instance, include prosodic properties in our definition, and can
elliptic sentences be determined as being declarative? For the present,
we will leave this to the intuition of the reader and concentrate on the
way declarative utterances that function as questions were selected.
Let us first introduce some abbreviations. B~p and MBsyp will be x
óelieves that p and x and y mutually believe that p(Bxp dc Byp 8z BxByp
8c ByB~p 8c ...), respectively. To concentrate on the belief of one agent,
a one-sided version of mutual belief will also be used: BMByyp (Bxp óc
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BZByp de ByByBsp 8c ...). The content of the utterance U is p; H and S
are hearer and speaker, respectively.
We call an utterance U a declarative question if and only if:
DEF:
a. The sentence type of U is declarative.
b. S believes that H is the expert on the topic: BSExpertH(topic(U)).
c. S believes that it is mutually believed that H is the expert on the
topic: BSMBSHEzpertg(topic(U)).
From the Gricean maxim of quantity (Grice (1975)) it follows that the
utterances defined by DEF lead to an implicature, or as Searle suggests,
an indirect interpretation (Searle (1975)), for if the addressee already
knows the content of the utterance (and this is mutually believed) it
would be superfluous.
Note that, if we assume that both `positive introspection' (BZp ~
BxBZp) and `distribution of conjunction' (BypBcBsq r--~ Bz(pdcq)) hold,
it can be inferred that the notion of mutual belief can be expressed in
terms of one-sided mutual belief:
1. BzpdcBxMB2yp H BMBZyp
In the definition, the concept of (one-sided) mutual belief is crucial. If the
speaker does not believe that the hearer is the expert, then the speaker's
utterance cannot be meant as a question, therefore BSExpertH(topic(U))
must be true. On the other hand if the speaker does not believe that
BHExperty(topic(U)), the speaker would think that the hearer cannot
interpret the utterance as superfluous and therefore cannot infer that
the utterance is meant as a question. So, if the speaker produces an
utterance for which he does not expect an answer, then the utterance
can never be meant as a question. Therefore, BsBKEzpertH(topic(U))





which is equivalent to BMBSHEzpertH(topic(U)) and by means of (1) is
equal to DEF (b) and (c). Note that if BsExpertH(topic(U)) is not the
case, the utterance can never be meant as a question; however, the hearer
may interpret the utterance as a question if BgEzperty(topic(U)). We
did not investigate these cases.
One might think that the selection of the declarative questions from
real-life dialogues still causes great difficulty because of the lack of a pre-
cise definition of terms such as expert, topic3 and declarative; in practice,
though, we seem to have a very good intuition of the terms and we will
try to clarify this by some examples.
We will refer to topic loosely as what the vtterance i9 aóout. For
instance, (3) is about the goal of the speaker.4
3. "I want to know what time it is"
The utterance is, although declarative, rejected by DEF because we will
presume that the speaker is the expert on his own goals. So topic is
restricted to the literal interpretation of the utterance. The same argu-
ment counts for sentence (4), where a performative is used in the matrix
sentence, for the explicit performative indicates that the utterance is
about the act of the speaker and the speaker knows best what act he
performed by uttering (4).
4. "I state that the capital of Corsica is Corte"
A(perhaps unwanted) consequence of DEF is that sentence ( 5) is also
rejected by DEF because of the explicit performative in the matrix sen-
t.ence.
5. "I ask you what time it is"
The previous examples bring us to the cases where DEF is satisfied.
We simply change the first person to the second, so in many cases where
the matrix sentence contains a boulemaic, epístemic or doxastic verb in
the second person, present or past tense, the definition is fulfilled, e.g.:
3See for instance Lugtenburg (1985) for a survey of definitions on topic.
'Here, punctuation marks are leít out to concentrate on lexical cuea only; other interpre-
tations can be obtained wóen, for instance, in spoken form special intonation patterns are
used.
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6. "You want to go to Venaco"
7. "You know whether Corsica is ruled by Italians"
8. "You thought that I have to leave at ten"
For the addressee knows best what he wants, thinks, etc. The same can
be said about performative verbs in the second person, past tense, e.g.:
9. "You asked the exact departure time"
10. "You said that the plane will leave at ten"
Again, the addressee knows best what he asked, said, etc. So, one would
expect that if these utterances are presented to subjects, they will identify
them as a question. In special circumstances, however, one can use these
forms to highlight certain aspects of an addressee's knowledge or actions,
e.g.:
11. "You said you would leave at ten. So, why are you still hanging
around?"
12. "You asked the exact departure times. Well, here they are."
These utterances are mainly used as an introduction to criticize an act
performed by the hearer (11) or to refresh the hearer's memory about
his own acts (12). So, the interpretation of the utterance as a question
can be rejected by contextual information. We did not encounter any of
these examples in our material.
All previous examples have clear indicators in the sentence itself. In
(13) it is impossible to determine the illocutionary force of the utterance
without contextual knowledge.
13. "The train leaves at 12.00"
Uttered by an information clerk the IF can be an answer, uttered by
an information seeker the force can be a question. It was expected,
however, that certain textual or, in the case of spoken dialogues, prosodic
cues could give an indication about its IF. This would imply that, if the
utterances are removed from the context, subjects can still determine
its IF. In the next section we will discuss which indicators probably
contribute to the question force of a declarative.
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4.3 Question indicators in natural dialogue
In this section a survey will be given of the question indicators we have
come across in the DQs of the recorded dialogues. These dialogues were
obtained from an experiment carried out in 1984 and 1985. In the ex-
periment, twenty-four Dutch-speaking subjects had to determine by tele-
phone the departure and arrival times of airplanes and trains from an
information clerk at Schiphol airport. The role of the information clerk
in the experiment was pla,yed by a well-trained person. By using the
telephone as the communication channel we avoided non-verbal aspects
of the communication, so all force indicators could be collected from the
speech material and the set-up of the experiment. To exclude speech in-
terruptions in the recorded signal, the information clerk and the subject
were recorded on different tracks of the tape recorder. (See Beun (1985)
for a more detailed discussion.)
In total 387 questions were counted in 189 dialogues. Almost 20~
of the questions (77 in total) had a declarative sentence type. In Ta-
ble 4.1 the question indicators are shown together with the number of
times they occur in the dialogues. Note that one utterance can have two
or more indicators. For example, all utterances with the indicator tag
"...hè" ("...right")5 at the end also had a rising intonation at the end.
In total only 47 utterances (61q of the DQs) possessed one or more of
the indicators of Table 4.1; the remaining 30 utterances (39~) did not
have any overt indicators. It should be stressed, however, that these
results only count for spoken dialogues. In Beun óc Bunt (1987) it was
shown that the number of DQ's dramatically decreases if people converse
without prosodic information: in terminal conversation the percentage
declaratives used for questioning is less than 2~.
In the experiment described in Beun (1989) these remaining utter-
ances were taken out of the original context, potential indicators were
removed and the edited versions were compared with the original ones.~
Subjects had to indicate the force (question or answer) from the speech
signal without contextual information.
SThe English translations are intended pragmatic equivalences.
~Utterances with the overt indicators of Table 4.1 (for example riaing intonation at the en~
were left out because it was feared that the subjects would only pay attention to these clear
cases to distinguish the IF.
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Table 4.1: Overt question indicators in DQs and their percentage of
occurrence related to the total number of DQs in the dialogues.
~ Question indicator ll






"u zei ... " ("you said ...") 6~ (5)















~ "u heót ... " ( "you have ..." ) 3~ (2)
"oh, dus ..." ( "oh, so ...") 1~ (1)
It was found that words like dus (so), oh and en (and) at the beginning
of the utterance significantly influenced the responses of the subjects.
Removing ook (also), niet (not), the pause indicator uh, mistakes followed
by self-repair and words which indicate uncertainty did not significantly
influence the responses of the subjects. A shortcoming in the analysis
was that the removal of certain words had the consequence of cutting
out certain prosodic aspects as well. We were accordingly unable to
discriminate prosodic indicators from textual ones. Therefore, in the




Twenty Dutch native-speakers took part in the experiment.~ Their task
was divided into two parts: in one part they had to determine from
the (Apple Macintosh) screen whether or not an utterance was originally
used as an answer (answer task), in the other part they had to determine
'The subjects were of both sexes, all over 18 and mainly students and people from the
institute.
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whether or not an utterance was used as a question (question task).a
One advantage of splitting up the answer and question tasks, instead
of simply asking to choose between answer and question, is that it can
easily be determined whether the responses in both tasks are related or
not. In each part 300 utterances were presented; the utterances of the
two parts were equal, only the order differed. Answer task, question task
and the two orders were counterbalanced, so that we had 4 subgroups of
5 subjects.
The subjects were told that the utterances presented on the screen
were isolated from real-life Schiphol dialogues. So, from the beginning of
the experiment they were aware of the domain of discourse.9 We did not
tell them that only declaratives were presented. They could think for as
long as they wanted and after one part a break of about 15 minutes was
inserted.
If the response of the subjects was positive they had to push a green
button in front of them, if negative they had to push a red button. They
always had to make a choice, even in doubtful cases. After pushing one
of the buttons a new utterance appeared after one second. All utterances
were complete sentences, beginning with a capital letter and were pre-
sented without punctuation, except for a very few cases where commas
were added to improve legibility.
4.4.2 The corpus of utterances
In the experiment three syntactic categories of declaratives were used,
namely a. S-V-A, b. S-Vl-A-V,~ and c. A-V-S, where S is the subject,
V (or V1 and V2) the verb and A an adverbial, consisting of one or more
elements taken from a set of times and places and their connecting prepo-
sitions, e.g., from Montreal, at twelve, etc. or a subordinate sentence (see
e.g., Quirk et al. (1972), de Vooys ( 1967)). For instance:lo
1. (a) Het vliegtuig vertrekt om twaalf uur uit Montreal
gThe utterances were only óased on the declarative questions and answers from the recorded
dialogues, so, contrary to the previous experiments, the responses of the subject could not be
compared with a real-life utterance.
9This was done to avoid the subjecta discovering the domain and adapting their responses
during the experiment.
"'Some of the English glosses are ill-formed because the Dutch sentences were literally
trans(ated.
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(The plane leaves at twelve from Montreal)
(b) Het vliegtuig is om twaalf uur gearriveerd
(The plane is at twelve arrived)
(c) Om twaalf uur vertrekt het vliegtuig
(At twelve leaves the plane)
The subject S was chosen from the following set of references:
{Ik (I), U (you), hij (he), zij (she), de trein (the train), de bus
(the bus), de reistijd (the travel time), de reis (the trip), het
vliegtuig (the plane), die (that~those), dat (that~those)}
Let us call these utterances simple utterances. Next, one or more prag-
matic particles were added at arbitrary, but syntactically correct, places
to the simple utterances. These particles were taken from the following
set:ll
{en (and), oh (oh), dus (so), wel, toch12, ook (also), niet (not)}
En and oh were only added at the beginning of the utterance. To avoid
recognition of the same recurring utterances, S and A were also varied,
e.g.:
2. Het vliegtuig vertrekt morgenmiddag
(The plane leaves tomorrow afternoon)
3. En de trein vertrekt om twaalf uur
(And the train leaves at twelve)
4. De bus vertrekt dus om vier uur
( The bus leaves so at four)
5. En het vliegtuig vertrekt niet om 1l.30 uur
(And the plane does not leave at 1~.30 hours)
"This set was based on the most frequently occurring particles in the recorded dialogue
material.
'~A translation of the words we! and toch ia hard to give and will be omitted.
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Here we neglected the influence of the length of the utterance on the
interpretation of its IF. It is to be expected, however, that the force
will mainly be determined by the meaning of the words. Note that
we cannot change S in an arbitrary way, otherwise in some cases the
utterances cannot be compared on the basis of the added words only.
For example, the interpretation of the force of (6) can be completely
difterent from the force of (7) because the subjects were aware of the
domain of discourse. They knew, for instance, that (6) could never be
uttered by the information clerk and (7) can be uttered by both. So
there clearly are asymmetries in the interpretation of the utterances.
6. Ik vertrek om tien uur
(I leave at ten)
7. Het vliegtuig vertrekt om tien uur
(The plane leaves at ten)
The new utterances were mixed with the simple utterances and pre-
sented one by one to the subjects.
Table 4.2: Number of utterances presented in the experiment, clas-
sified into syntactic features and the added particle. The numbers
between brackets refer to the number of utterances used in the re-
sults; utterances with more than one particle ("~ 1 particle") were
not considered in the results.
S- V-A S- Vl-A- VPZ - A- V-S total
simple ut. 55 8 10 73 (47) ~
en 19 2 7 28 (22) ~













niet 9 0 1 10 (9) '











Table 4.2 gives a survey of the type of utterances presented in the
experiment. For instance, 216 utterances had an S-V-A syntax, in 30 of
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them only the word dus was included and 25 of the utterances with dus
were compared with the simple utterances in the results.
In the experiment the hypothesis stated in section 4.2 was also tested,
namely that utterances with mental state or performative verbs (and
their restrictions) in the matrix sentence will result in a question in-
terpretation. Therefore the verbs zeggen (say; 6 utterances), bedoelen
(mean; 5), willen (want; 6) and vermoeden (suspect; 6) were put in the
second person singular. Although they were part of the 300 utterances,
their results were treated separately from the other utterances.
4.5 Results
Before discussing the results, let us introduce some abbreviations for
frequently used terms.
(yes)answer: the utterance is interpreted as an answer in the answer
task.
(yes)question: the utterance is interpreted as a question in the ques-
tion task.
(-)utterance: the simple utterance, that is the utterance without cer-
tain particles.
(-{-)utterance: the utterance with added particle.
In Figures 4.1 and 4.2 the percentages of positive responses in the
answer and question tasks are shown. These figures show the difference
in (yes)answers and (yes)questions respectively between ( -)utterances
(white rectangle) and (f)utterances (shaded rectangle).
We can see for instance in Figure 4.1 that simple utterances without
en (and) at the beginning were interpreted in 83~ of cases as an ans~ver.
The same utterances with en were interpreted in 56~ of cases as an
answer. On the other hand, if we return to the question function in
Figure 4.2, we see a shift from (-) utterances to utterances with the en
indicator of 11~ to 32~. The shift in the utterances without or with
dus (so) is even more dramatic: in the answer task from 91~ to 18~; in









0 r ~ ~
~ with particle
en dus toch ook niet wel oh
Figure 4.1: The shift of (yes)answers as a function of the absence
(white rectangle) and the presence (shaded rectangle) of pragmatic par-
ticles. Line lA shows the mean value of (yes)answers with respect to
the simple utterances.
I A
and oh differed significantly from the (-)utterances, in both the answer
and question task. (In all cases Xdf-1 1 13, p G 0.001)
The total number of responses per particle can be calculated from
the numbers between brackets in Table 4.2. For instance, we have 22
utterances with en, 22 matching (-)utterances and 20 subjects, so the
total number is 880 (- 2 x 22 x 20).
From Figures 4.1 and 4.2 we can see that the presented (-)utterances
were not neutral with respect to a question or answer interpretation. In
the answer task 86~ of them was interpreted as (yes)answer, in the ques-
tion task 11~ was interpreted as (yes)question, indicated respectively by
line lA and lQ. Note that Figures 4.1 and 4.2, although they show com-
plementary results in all cases, do not have to be complements because
the answer and question tasks were independent.











en dus toch ook niet wel oh
Figure 4.2: The shift of (yes)questions as a function of the absence
(white rectangle) and the presence (shaded rectangle) of pragmatic par-
ticles. Line !Q shows the mean value of (yes)questions with respect to
the simple utterances.
I a
The results of the performative and mental state verbs are depicted
in Table 4.3. The addition of particles hardly influenced the responses
and therefore the values in Table 4.3 are the mean values of both
(-)utterances and (f)utterances.
Table 4.3: Percentage ( yes)answers and (yes)questions as a








willen (want) 10~ 93~
vermoeden (suspect) 3~ 93~
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4.6 Discussion
From Figures 4.1 and 4.2 we can see that the simple utterances were not
neutral with respect to the answer~question force. Lines lA and lQ show
that in almost 90~ of the cases the simple utterances were interpreted
as answers or non-questions. In 75~ the topic of the simple utterances
was train or airplane information, like:
1. "The train leaves at twelve"
Intuitively it seems very natural to interpret these utterances as an
answer. In section 4.2, though, we suggested that, depending on the
speaker, (1~ could be either an answer or a question. So, why do sub-
jects prefer the answer interpretation?
If we take a closer look at the recorded dialogues we see that almost all
answers have the following form: declarative, no special discourse marker
(i.e. no rising intonation, no particle, etc.~ and complete sentences. On
the other hand, only 6~ of the DQs (5 out of 77~ have the same form as
the answers. Therefore, we could say that, if we have to choose between
question or answer, every declarative is an answer by default, unless
special indicators are added.
The deviation from a 100~ answer interpretation of the simple ut-
terances is mainly caused by sentences that were clearly uttered by the
information seeker, such as:
2. "I have to be there at eleven in the morning"
So, another criterion was the speaker of the utterance. This was con-
firmed afterwards by most of the subjects. All subjects were interviewed
after the experiment and 80q of them stated that during the experiment
they tried to imagine who the speaker could have been, the information
clerk or the information seeker.
The subjects also stated that in many cases they had problems making
a decision. It is very likely, however, that subjects responded highly
consistently in the answer and question tasks, because Figures 4.1 and
4.2 are almost complementary.
The results agree with the experiments described in Beun (1989~. It
was already noted that cutting out certain words in the acoustic signal
removed both prosodic and textual aspects of the utterance. Therefore
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it could not be concluded which feature played a decisive role in the
subject's responses. The similar results of the experiment described in
this paper strongly suggest that prosodic features, other than a rising
intonation at the end, played a minor role in the previous experiments.
This is supported by the fact that all particles in the latter experiments
were not accentuated and formed only a small part of the total speech
signal.
This brings us to the next topic, namely how do the particles influ-
ence the responses of the subjects? Although all particles influenced the
responses in the same direction, that is, a decrease in answer interpreta-
tions and an increase in question interpretations when the particles were
added, we will concentrate only on the cases where significant differences
appeared: en (and), dus (so), oh (oh) and toch.
En ( and) at the beginning of the utterance: In general en will be
used in Dutch as a conjunction between two propositions or a se-
quential ordering of two events. In this case the first conjunct is
missing. So, here we have two possibilities. First, there is only one
"conjunct". In this case the en does not represent a conjunction at
all. Second, there are two conjuncts but the first conjunct is situ-
ated elsewhere. The first solution is not an attractive one, because
it would commit us to changing the meaning of en drastically and
also it would not correspond to the empirical data of the recorded
dialogues, since in almost 90~ (17 out of 19) of the recorded declar-
atives with en, the en linked a previous statement uttered by the
dialogue partner.13 This link was established by a return to the
topic of the first conjunct.
How can the second possibility help us to explain the significant
difference in responses in Figures 4.1 and 4.2? First, it might be
assumed that any word or morpheme neutral with respect to a ques-
tion force added at the beginning of an utterance will change the
responses of the subjects. At first sight en seems quite neutral with
respect to a question or answer interpretation, so we have no evi-
dence against this assumption. On the other hand, maybe en is not
neutral with respect to both interpretations.
13The utterance is not necessarily the previous utterance.
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From the sentences with mental state verbs (e.g., `mean' and `want')
we know that subjects take the expert on the topic into account, i.e.
declaratives uttered by the non-expert are interpreted as questions.
So, if subjects believe that the declarative with en at the beginning
is uttered by the non-expert, they would prefer a question interpre-
tation. But why would subjects believe that these declaratives are
uttered by the non-expert?
Again, a closer look at the recorded dialogues is required. In almost
all cases en at the beginning of a declarative connects the declar-
ative of the speaker with an answer of the dialogue partner. The
subjects were told that the utterances always came from the begin-
ning of a speech turn, so they knew that the utterance was not a
second part of a conjunction spoken by the same speaker. In our
discourse domain an answer is always uttered by the expert on the
topic.l' If the en does not connect two arbitrary statements, but
two statements about the same topic (see van Dijk (1977)), then the
second statement (or rather `declarative') is always uttered by the
non-expert and so, the utterance will be interpreted as a question.
Dus (so): In the recorded dialogues all declarative questions with dus
were used as drawing a conclusion from one or more statements of
the dialogue partner and, in some cases, mutual world knowledge.
If dus is uttered by the one who presents the facts, it is usually done
at the end of the same turn in which the facts were presented. On
the other hand, if the utterance with dus is at the beginning of a
turn, then the utterance is mostly uttered by the non-expert as a
conclusion from the facts presented by the dialogue partner. So the
total utterance will be interpreted as a question.
Toch: According to Pander Maat and Sauer (1986) toch focusses on
conflicting beliefs and expectations between the dialogue partners
during the dialogue. If in cooperative dialogues one of the pur-
poses is to avoid conflicts or to find solutions for conflicts, then the
dialogue partner is exhorted by the dialogue situation to respond.
So the con,fdict seems to elicit the response and the word toch only
14In other domains of discourse, such as for instance an examination, the questioner can be
the expert.
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draws attention to the conflict. However, the same can be stated
about the accentuated particle wel, which often corrects a negation
in a previous utterance. From the experiment, it followed that no
significant shifts appeared when the particle wel was removed and
therefore the conflicting situation cannot be the only reason. Hence,
beside the adversative element, toch also seems to express that the
hearer is exhorted to react, which could explain the dramatic shift
in the subjects' responses.
Oh: In Dutch oh seems to work in the same way as the English oh,
therefore the function will be discussed from the English particle.
SchifFrin (1987) discusses that English oh marks different tasks of
information management in discourse. She distinguishes four dif-
ferent functions of oh: (1) the introduction of a repair unit, (2) as
a preface in questions, answers and~or acknowledgements, (3) as a
marker of the status of information (e.g., new vs. old information)
and (4) the introduction of a shift in subjective orientation (e.g., the
intensity of a speaker's commitment to the truth of a proposition).
As an overall function oh marks a focus of a speaker's attention and
marks information as more salient. The particle is often used when
locally provided information does not correspond to a speaker's prior
expectations and is often followed by a request for clarification and
elaboration.
If the subjects are aware of these functions, this can explain the shift
of subjects' responses. The question function of the utterance can
easily be determined from the particle itself. Note, however, that
the shift is not as dramatic as in the case of dus and toch, which is
probably caused by the ambiguous meaning of oh. The functions,
(3) and ( 4) and the initiation of an answer and~or acknowledgement
in (2) do not suggest any question function at all.
4.7 Conclusion
We hypothesized that in the decision, whether the illocutionary force of
a declarative is interpreted as a question or not, three indicators play an
important role: prosodic, textual and contextual characteristics of the
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utterance. In this paper we have mainly concentrated on the textual
indicators. We found that two types of textual indicators are relevant in
the recognition of a declarative as a question in isolation, namely:
l. Indicators that determine the expert on the topic of the utterance.
2. Indicators that express conflicting beliefs between the hearer and
speaker, and~or surprise of the speaker about a stated proposition.
Examples of the first type are the use of special verbs (e.g., epistemic,
performative) in the second person, present or past tense, and the use of
particles like en at the beginning of the utterance and dv~s. Examples of
the second type are the particles oh and toch.
The results of the visual and the auditory experiments are very similar.
Since the subjects in the latter experiment could decide on prosodic and
textual information and in the first experiment on textual information
only, it is likely that, apart from rising intonation, prosodic character-
istics have played a minor role in the recognition of a declarative as a
question in spoken utterances. It would be premature to conclude that
prosodic characteristics always play a minor role, because in 48~ of the
recorded DQs a rising intonation was used at the end of the utterance
and these utterances were not tested in the auditory experiment. The
conclusion is also weakened by the fact that subjects hardly use declar-
ative questions in dialogues where prosodic cues are absent.
It should be stressed that prosodic cues can be more important in
languages where textual marking is less often used for questioning (e.g.,
French, Italian and modern Greek~15. If the recognition of the question
heavily depends on prosodic cues and no syntactic or morphological in-
formation is available, it would not only be interesting to know which
prosodic cues are used in spoken conversation but also which cues are
used in conversation if no prosodic information is available.
From some examples in section 4.2 it followed that the function of the
indicators as a reference to the expert can be overruled by contextual
cues. In general all the indicators discussed in this paper can be overruled
by contextual cues; if contextual cues are insufficient, however, indicators
can contribute to a question interpretation of the utterance.
`SThis was pointed out by Hartmut Haberland (personal communication).
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A point for future research is to determine why people use a declara-
tive instead of an interrogative to ask a question. If a declarative is used
to express that the speaker has a certain supposition about the declara-








Questions in spoken dialogues are often uttered with a declarative sentence type. Since
more than 50q of these questions cannot be recognized as such without contextual
features, a speaker must have, at the risk of misunderstanding, special reasons to use a
declarative form instead of an interrogative one. To determine the contextual features
that contribute to the use of a declarative question, two experiments were carried out.
In the experiments dialogues taken from transcriptions of Dutch telephone conversa-
tions were presented in printed form to subjects. In the first experiment the preference
of the subjects was tested for a declarative or an interrogative form; in the second
experiment the subjects had to indicate the certainty of the speaker about the proposi-
tional content of the declarative. It was found that preference for a declarative form is
low if no information about the content of the question was provided in the dialogue;
preference increases if information can be derived from conversational principles or im-
plication, or if the information was literally provided in the dialogue. The outcome
correlates significantly with the subjects' responses about the speaker's degree of cer-
tainty. Moreover, it is argued that, although verification is an important function of





In spoken information dialogues, almost 20~ of questions are put in
a declarative form and in more than half of these cases the question
function cannot be identified without contextual features (Beun (1989)).
Since hearers hardly ever doubt the function of questions in dialogues,
they must use contextual knowledge for identification if overt question
indicators are absent; the speaker, on the other hand, must be sure
that the function will be recognized, so he must count on the contextual
knowledge available to the hearer.
Unless special question markers (e.g., intonation patterns, special par-
ticles, propositional content) are used, a declarative question (DQ) can
be considered to be indírect (Levinson (1983)), and the speaker must
have, at the risk of misunderstanding, special reasons to use a declara-
tive (D-form) instead of an interrogative (I-form) as the syntactic form
of a question. In this paper we will try to find out what information is
communicated by the speaker if a D-form is used and how contextual
features influence the use of a D-form of questions in natural-language
dialogues.
Contextual knowledge does not only include knowledge about the
world, but also knowledge about relevant aspects of the mental etates
of the dialogue participants in terms of intentions, beliefs, expectations,
etc. and general principles of cooperative and rational behaviour. Here,
mental states will be restricted to the participants' intentions and beliefs,
and it is assumed that a mental state can be changed during the dialogue
by means of communicative acts performed by the participants. For in-
stance, if a speaker utters a declarative, the hearer may take over the
proposition expressed by the declarative unless he has evidence to the
contrary, or, if a speaker utters an interrogative, the hearer may come
to believe that the speaker wants to know something.
To find out which particular contextual knowledge influences the use
of a D-form or an I-form of questions in a dialogue situation, the prefer-
ence of subjects for one of the two forms was tested in an experiment. In
a second experiment the speaker's certainty about the propositional con-
tent of the D-form was tested. The type of dialogue will be restricted to
so-called information dialogues (Bunt (1989a)), where the participants
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have the sole purpose of transferring certain factual information. In
these dialogues it is not only assumed that the participants behave in a
cooperative (Grice (1975)) and rational (Allwood (1976)) way, but also
apply certain rules of politeness (Leech (1983)). The domain of discourse
will be restricted to the exchange of information about the arrival and
departure times of aircraft and trains.
Before we discuss the experiments and their results, let us first focus
on some proposed functions of DQs in dialogues.
5.2 The function of declarative questions
Consider the following telephone dialogue between an informant at Am-
sterdam airport (I) and an information seeker (S):1
Dialogue A
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Good morning. Next Monday I want to go by plane
to Paris,
I: Yes...
S: and I have to be there at about two o'clock in
the afternoon. What time do I have to leave to
be there in time?
I: Well, the plane leaves at 11.30 and it will
arrive at 13.30 and there is another one at ...
no,
Yov said Saturday?
The italicized utterance by I is an example of a question with a D-
form. Here, the use of the declarative as a question is accentuated by the
question mark; in spoken dialogues, however, overt question indicators
are often omitted and most of the recognition comes from contextua]
`All dialogues considered in this paper were recorded at the Institute for Perception Research
in Eindhoven (IPO). In order to focus on the relevant part of the dialogues, some transcrip-
tion symbols have been omitted from the original transcriptions. Punctustion marks do not
correspond to prosodic features and are only added to improve legibility. For more detailed
information, see Beun (1985).
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cues. Even prosodic characteristics, like a final rising intonation, can be
overruled by the circumstances of the utterance (Geluykens (1987)).
In Beun (1988a) the idea was discussed that the interpretation of the
declarative as a question depends on the mutual belief of the hearer
and speaker that the hearer is the expert on the topic of the utterance.
For instance, in "You said Saturday" S is both hearer and expert, since
S usually knows best which acts he has performed, and therefore the
utterance may be interpreted as a question.2 The belief of the dialogue
participants as to who is the expert on the topic can come from the
utterance itself or from its circumstances.
It is unclear, however, why a D-form was used instead of an I-form.
If a speaker asks a question with a declarative sentence type he is typi-
cally violating the Gricean cooperative principle (Grice (1975)) and one
or more of its corresponding maxims; so the speaker may have special
reasons for choosing the declarative form. Note that it is not obvious
which maxims are violated. One could think of the quality maxim be-
cause the speaker does not have enough evidence for his statement. On
the other hand, if the speaker thinks that the hearer knows the value of
the expressed proposition, he is communicating superfluous information,
and therefore violates the quantity maxim. One could even argue that
the wrong surface structure is used, hence also the manner maxim could
have been violated.
Intuitively, the DQ in the example mentioned above functions as a
verification, i.e. beside signalling to the hearer that the speaker wants
certain information, the speaker also expresses a weak belief about the
propositional content of the DQ. Another use of DQs (which does not
follow from the example above) is associated with the development of
the topic during the dialogue (Springorum (1986)). Let us consider both
functions more closely.
5.2.1 Declarative questions as verifications
Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech and Svartvik (1972) state that the speaker
puts a positive (or negative) assv,mption and a neutral expectation in a
zAgain, this example is highly context-dependent. Utterances like "You know what time it
is" or "You feel sick" are probably more convincing, because a speaker hae no direct accesa to
a hearer's mental state and therefore can never be the expert on the hearer's mental atate.
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DQ, and that the casual tone suggests that the speaker takes the answer
"yes" (or "no") as a foregone conclusion. This statement is not easily
verified, however. If a speaker has a certain assumption about the answer,
how then can his expectation be neutral? And, is there any reason to
assume that a speaker makes certain assumptions about the content of
the answer, except by intuition?
To some extent, the assumed belief can be inferred from empirical
data. Taking a closer look at the corpus of recorded telephone dialogues,
we see that 64 out of 77 DQs (83~) evoked a positive answer from the
dialogue partner; in only 5 cases (6~) was the answer negative. Hence,
it appears that the questioners have certain beliefs or assumptions about
the content of the question, as it seems implausible that they would evoke
so many positive responses without these.3
More evidence about the assumed belief comes from the form of repe-
titions of answers in the dialogues (Beun (1985)). An important scheme
of the functional elements in the dialogue structure is the following:
A: - Question
B: - Answer
A: - Repetition of the answer
B: - Response to the repetition
It was found that one of the possible functions of the repetition of the
answer is a verification of that answer. The belief about the content
of the verification seems to be very strong because the information has
previously been stated by the dialogue partner. In all cases where a
repetition was a complete sentence, the sentence type was declarative
and the repetition evoked a positive response. So, at least in these cases,
questions with a declarative sentence type strongly indicate a cert.ain
belief of the speaker about the content.
If an answer is repeated by means of a DQ, the information about
the content of the DQ is literally provided in the preceding discourse;
however, as we can see from the following example, the information may
come from other sources as well.
~Although it is tempting to say that the beliefs of both participanta correspond, we can
only conclude that the belief of the responding person corresponds with the content of the DQ.
Whether the content of the DQ corresponds to the belief of the questioner is precisely what we




S: Good morning. I would like to know the arrival
time of the plane from Nice, flight number
KL338.
I: That is today?
In this case, the information in the DQ that the arrival time refers to the
same day as the day of the conversation cannot be derived solely from
the semantic content of the utterance by S. The information seems to
come from a pragmatic rule which roughly states that, if no information
is provided about the day of arrival, the day of the conversation is as-
sumed as long as no evidence to the contrary exists. We will assume that
the inference is triggered by the Gricean cooperative principle, since S'
utterance is conversationally inadequate with respect to an unequivocal
determination of the day of arrival.
So, we can hypothesize that the declarative sentence type of a question
in some cases will be caused by a certain belief or assumption about the
content of the question and that the origin of the belief may come from
different sources. In the experiments we will consider the following origin
of information about the content. (In the examples below we will refer
to the dialogues enclosed in the appendix.)
. The information was literally given by the dialogue partner in the
previous discourse or could be inferred by implication from a previ-
ous utterance of the dialogue partner. An example of this type is
dialogue 3a in the appendix.
. The information was derived by implicature from Gricean conversa-
tional principles (Grice (1975)) such as the quantityor the relevance
maxim.
Implicatures from the quantity maxim may come from the first or
the second submaxim, i.e. `make your contribution as informative as
is required for the current purpose of the exchange' and `do not make
your contribution more informative than is required', respectively.
An example of the first submaxim is dialogue 5a, an example of the
second is dialogue 8a.
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The relevance maxim will be restricted to the specific case of a
question~answer pair. It will be supposed that the semantic content
of an answer is related to the content of the previous question. An
example is dialogue 2a.
. No information could be derived from the previous discourse but
only from world krtowledge of the speaker of the target, or the in-
formation was not derivable at all. Examples are dialogue 4a and
dialogue 9a, respectively.
5.2.2 Declarative questions and topical development
Another use of DQs was found by Springorum (1986~. He described
Dutch dialogues where a doctor is diagnosing a patient's illness and notes
that questions asked by the doctor are often put in a D-form when at-
tention is shifted to another topic in the dialogue. It was not possible
to recover the doctor's assumed belief about the content of the DQ from
these dialogues, so this might suggest that the function of a D-form in
a question may be the announcement of a new topic in the dialogue.
This implies that topical aspects may influence the use of a declarative
sentence type in questions and therefore we will also take these aspects
into account.
In the experiments four types of topical development will be consid-
ered: topic continuation, shift, recycling and change.4
~ Topic continuation implies that the topic of the previous turn is
related to the topic of the DQ. In the dialogues, topic continuation
was established in two ways:
a. The informant wants elucidation of a question previously asked
by the information seeker. An example of this type is dialogue
la in the appendix.
'These types were taken from Gardner (1987}. Gardner introduces two more types: topic
introduction and reintroduction. The first concerns the first topic once the initial atage has
passed. Since no DQ comes directly after the initial stage this type will not be considered here.
The latter concerns a return to a previous topic, whilst the topic of a previous sequence is not
related to any other topic in the dialogue (e.g.,interruptiona). This type did not appear in our
dialogues either.
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b. The information seeker wants elucidation of an answer previ-
ously given by the informant. An example of this type ís dia-
logue 2a.
In many cases co-referentiality is an important indicator for topic
continuation, especially the use of demonstratives which refer to a
certain concept mentioned in the previous speech turn.5
. Topic shift occurs when the topic of the DQ is linked to the previ-
ous utterance but broaches a different aspect of the utterance. For
instance, the previous utterance is about `indirect flights' and the
DQ is about `non-stop flights' (e.g., dialogue 12a).
. Topic change occurs where the topic of the DQ is unrelated to all
previous topics in the exchange. For instance, S asks what time
planes arrive from Moskow, I answers the question and next, S asks
whether any buses go from Amsterdam to Schiphol airport (e.g.,
dialogue 6b).
. Topic recycling occurs if the topic of the DQ changes with regard
to the topic of the previous exchange and continues with regard to
earlier exchanges (e.g., dialogue 3b).
5.3 The experiments
Two experiments tested how contextual features influenced the subjects'
preference for a D- or I-form and how contextual features infuenced the
speaker's certainty (indicated by the subjects) about the content of the
DQ. In both experiments dialogues were presented in printed form to 24
subjects; all subjects from the first experiment difFered from the subjects
of the second. The subjects were Dutch native speakers, of both sexes,
all over 18 and mainly students and stafF members from the institute.
~Levinson ( 1983) argues that co-referentiality, or a set of shared concepts, is not always
sufficient to establish topical coherence. In his examples, however, no demonstratives were used
and in all cases topic change markers appear, such as "Hey" or "By the way".
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5.3.1 General structure of the dialogues
Eighteen dialogues were taken from transcriptions of Dutch telephone
conversations (see also the appendix), recorded in a previous experi-
ment (Beun (1985)), between an informant (I) from Amsterdam airport
(Schiphol) and an information-seeker (S). To improve legibility, non-
relevant errors and hesitations were removed from the transcriptions. In
many cases the dialogue presented was not the whole original dialogue
but only a relevant part. The sequential organization of the dialogues
used in the experiment was as follows:
. Each dialogue had an initial stage of identification and greeting,
for example, "Schiphol Information", "Good morning", and so on.
These beginning sequences were added to induce the subjects to
think that the only information exchange between I and S was the
information available on paper.
. After the initial stage S asked a direct or indirect question; in some
cases S supplied introductory information about his travel plans
between the question and the initial stage.
. No dialogue had a closing section (Schegloff dc Sacks (1973)), i.e.
sequences such as A: "OK", B: "OK", A: "Bye", B: "Bye" had
been omitted from the transcriptions. (See also below.)
. Dialogues were relatively short, i.e. the shortest dialogue had 3
speaking turns and the longest had 9 turns including the initial
stage.
Each dialogue consisted of two parts, the conte~tual part, where con-
textual information was provided, and the target part, on which t.he sub-
jects had to make certain judgements. In both experiments two versions
of each dialogue were presented: the original one, and an edited ver-
sion where information was changed in the contextual or the target part
with respect to the semantic content of the target, or the topical relation
between both parts.
The target part in the first experiment consisted of two questions, (i)
and (ii) (see the example below). One of them was put in a D-form,
the other in an I-form. In both cases question-marks were put at the
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end. In the second experiment the target part only consisted of the D-
form of the first experiment. In this case the question-mark was replaced
by a full stop, so that the utterance looked like a statement by I or S.
This was done because we were only interested in the subject's judgement
about the propositional content of the utterance which is expressed more
directly in a statement than a question. All dialogues ended after the
target part, so that the subjects had no more information available about
the discourse than the dialogue participants at the moment of the target
part.
The following example shows a translation in English of two dialogues
used in the first experiment, an original and its edited version. The
contextual part is represented in typewriter style, the target part in
italics.~ The first one is the original dialogue.
Dialogue C1
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Good morning, this is H. Next week I am going by
plane to Montreal, I don't know the flight
number, KL 671 or KL 571. Can you tell me what
time I have to catch the train in Den Haag to be
in time at Schiphol?
I: Your flight is KL 671.
S: Yes
I: And it will leave at 14.40.
(i~ You would like to come by train?
(ii~ Would you like to come by train?
In the second version the information that S wants to go by train to
Schiphol is removed from the contextual part:
Dialogue C2
I: Schiphol Information.
~In the second experiment, the contextual part remained the same, but the target part was
replaced by the utterance ~You would like to come by train.'.
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S: Hello, next week I am going by plane to
Singapore, I don't know the flight number, LH
410 or LH 510. Can you tell me what time I have
to leave Tilburg to be in time at Schiphol?
I: Your flight is LH 510.
S: Yes
I: And it will leave at six in the evening.
(i~ You would like to come by train?
~ii~ Would you like to come 6y train?
In previous experiments (Beun (1988a~ and Beun (1989~~ it was found
that certain particles could influence the interpretation of a D-form as
a question. Since the occurrence of these particles could influence the
subjects' responses, and since we were interested in the influence of con-
textual features only, in both experiments particles like so, well and
oh were removed from the target sentences without losing relevant in-
formation about the semantic content of the sentence. Note that the
flight numbers, cities, times and introductions were changed, although
the structure of the edited dialogue remains the same. This was done to
avoid that the subjects would recognize the intended differences between
the original and the edited dialogues.
5.3.2 The dialogues separately discussed
Since it will not be clear in all cases how the information in the dialogues
was manipulated, let us pay some attention to each dialogue separately.
A survey of the origin of t.he content information and the topical devel-
opment of the target part is given in Table 5.1. The appendix provides
English translations of the original and the edited dialogues; the target
part is taken from the first experiment, so, the declarative and the inter-
rogative question are both represented.
Dialogue 1
In dialogue lb the information about the target was literally given in
the previous discourse. In dialogue la I commits an error and it is to
be expected that I is less certain about the answer since she failed to
recover the correct day.
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Dialogue 2
In dialogues 2a and 2b the relevance maxim is applicable, since I's answer
should be interpreted in the light of the previous question. Therefore,
in dialogue 2a the answer refers to arrival times on Sunday; in 26 the
supposition expressed in the target is weakened by the use of the word
`possibly'.
Dialogue 3
In dialogues 3a and 36 the information is literally given by I. In dialogue
3b an intermediate sequence about a different topic was added so that
the target can be regarded as a topic recycle.
Dialogue 4
In dialogue 4a the information is not provided in the discourse and may
come from world knowledge of the speaker. In dialogue 4b I gives the
information that S has to check in one and a half hours before departure.
Note that in the first dialogue topic changes with respect to the previous
discourse; in the second dialogue topic continues.
Dialogue 5
In dialogue 5a I communicates that she has no information about bus ser-
vices. By quantity, however, I is supposed to give the strongest available
information. So, from this, S may infer that I also has no information
about departure times of buses early in the morning.~ In dialogue 5b no
information was provided about the content of the question.
Dialogue 6
In both dialogues no information is provided in the previous discourse.
If any information is available, it may come from world knowledge pos-
sessed by the speaker. In dialogue 6b topic changes with respect to the
discourse, in dialogue 6a topic shifts from the trip from Tilburg in gen-
eral to the more specific information about train departure times.
'Note that the information cannot be inferred by implication. The fact that I has no infor-
mation about bus services does not imply that I does not know whether a bue leaves early in
the morning.
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Dialogue 7
Dialogues 7a and 76 are similar to dialogues 2a and 2b. In dialogue 7a
I's answer refers to the arrival time of the plane in the afternoon or the
next morning. In dialogue 76 S asked only for flights in the afternoon;
however, I's answer is not likely to be meant for the plane in the after-
noon since the hour of arrival (9.55) refers to the morning. By means of
the second submaxim of quantity it may be derived that the arrival time
is meant for the next morning. Note that the dialogue takes place in the
afternoon, since S opens with "Good afternoon".
Dialogue 8
In dialogue 8a a question is asked about arrival times without mention-
ing the day of arrival. In most cases the day of arrival refers to `today'
by the second submaxim of quantity. In dialogue 8b I's question seems
very unlikely, unless she has any evidence from the flight number that
the plane arrived yesterday, and not today or the next day. In that case,
the information may come from world knowledge.
Dialogue 9
In dialogues 9a and 9b no information is provided about S' last question.
In 9b I shows at least that she is aware that S has to take an early train.
Dialogue 10
In dialogue l0a S provides implicitly the information in the question that
he or she wants to come by train; in dialogue lOb no such information is
given.
Dialogue 11
In dialogues lla and 116 no information is given about S' last question.
In ilb, however, S asks about buses from Eindhoven to Schiphol and
therefore causes a topical change; in dialogue lla S asks about a specific
aspect of the flight and is therefore labelled as `topic continuation'.
Dialogue 12
If I is aware that S would prefer a non-stop flight (which is usually the
case) then I would have given a more informative answer. From this S
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may infer by quantity in dialogue 12b that there are no non-stop flights.
In dialogue 12a the same information is provided but S asks a question
about which no information is given in the previous discourse. Note that
in both dialogues topic shifts from indirect flights to non-stop flights.
Dialogue 13
In dialogue 13a S may infer from quantity that I provided all the nec-
essary information. In 13b no information about S' question is provided
in the previous discourse.
Dialogue 14
In both dialogues the information about S' last question may come from
world knowledge. Usually the schedule in the weekend is different, so
one may expect a stronger supposition about the content of the question
in dialogue 14b. In both dialogues topic shifts from the schedule `today'
to the schedule during the weekend.
Dialogue 15
In dialogue 15a I mentions one flight on Saturday and two flights on Sun-
day, from which S may infer by implication that there are three flights
in two days. In dialogue 156 explicit information about the day of ar-
rival is left out, but, by relevance, the answer may refer to the two days
mentioned before, which implies that there are three flights (or more~ in
two days.
Dialogue 16
In dialogue 16a it may be inferred by quantity that there is only one
flight; in dialogue 16b I answers literally that the flight mentioned is the
only flight that day.
Dialogue 17
In dialogue 176 S asks explicitly for arrival times today and tomorrow,
so we may expect by relevance that the answer refers to both days. In
dialogue 17a I answers that there are three flights a day, from which S
may infer by the second submaxim of quantity that the answer will also
count for tomorrow.
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Dialogue 18
In dialogue 18a the information is provided that S has to check in one
and a half hours before departure. From this S may infer by implication
that she or he has to arrive at Schiphol about one and a half hours before
departure, which is around 13.30. In dialogue 18b no such information
is provided in the previous discourse.
5.3.3 The task
Experiment 1
In the first experiment the subjects were told that all dialogues were
taken from real-life telephone dialogues and they were asked to guess
which form of the target part was originally used in the dialogue, the
D- or the I-form. To counterbalance both forms, all dialogues were pre-
sented twice, so that both forms were presented equally as (i) and (ii).
An advantage of this method was that the consistency of the subjects'
responses could also be checked. In all, 72 dialogues (2 x 2 x 18) were
presented in the first experiment.
Experiment 2
The task of the subjects in the second experiment was to judge on a scale
from 0 to 4 how certain the speaker (I or S) of the target sentence was
about the content of the sentence. Very uncertain was represented by 0,
very certain by 4. Here, no counterbalance was needed with respect to
the target part, so only 36 dialogues were presented to the subjects.
Before we discuss the results, let us first summarize the difFerences be-
tween experiments 1 and 2. The target part of experiment 1 consisted
of two questions, a D-form and an I-form. The subjects had to indicate
which of the two forms was originally used in the dialogue and the total
number of dialogues presented was 72.
The target part of experiment 2 consisted of one statement (the D-
form of experiment 1; the question mark was replaced by a full stop).
The subjects had to judge the speaker's certainty about the content of
the statement and the total number of dialogues presented was 36.
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5.4 Results
Table 5.1 shows the results for the 36 dialogues in pairs labelled a~t b.
The first (a) always denotes the original dialogue; in the second (b) small
changes were made. The column information shows the source of the
belief about the content. Here we have five options:8 world (knowledge)
or no inf(ormation), relevance or quantity, and literally or implication.
The column topic indicates the topical development of the target part.
Here we have four options: cont(inuation), shift, recycl(ing) and change.
Column expl indicates the percentage declaratives that were predicted
by the subjects in the first experiment (100~ - 48 responses). Dialogues
2, 4, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16 and 17 showed a significant difference between
the two versions in the use of declaratives. (In all cases Xdf-1 ~ 4.80,
p G 0.05.) Significant differences are indicated by `~'.
The column exp2 shows the mean degree of certainty scored by the
subjects in the second experiment on a scale from 0 to 4. Dialogues
1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18 showed a significant difference
between the two versions in the degree of certainty (sign test applied over
the degree of certainty per subject; in all cases p G 0.05.). Significant
differences are indicated by `~'.
For all pairs of dialogues where both the use of declaratives and degree
of certainty showed a significant difference (dialogues 4, 10, 13, 15, 16 and
17), the results show the same behaviour. That is, if the use of declara-
tives increases, certainty also increases, and vice versa. The hypothesis
that the two are uncorrelated can be rejected, with p G 0.02. (Here,
the sign was applied over the diflerences in results of the percentage of
declaratives and the degree of certainty.)
In Figures 5.1 and 5.2 the average percentage declaratives and the
average degree of certainty are successively shown as a function of the
source of information. Literal information or information derived by
implication is indicated by `L' (Literal; number of dialogues (n) - 8),
information derived from the maxims is indicated by `I' (Implicature; n-
12), and information derived from world knowledge or no information is
indicated by `N' (No information; n- 15). In both experiments the
sThere is one exception, however, in the first dialogue where the informant makes a mietake.
The dialogue was separated from the others because it can hardly be clasaified in one of the
other groups.
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Table 5.1: Survey oC the origin of information and topical devel-
opment of the target part for the 18 pairs of dialogues. Column
expl indicates the percentage declaratives predicted by the subjects
in the first experiment; column ezp2 shows the mean degree of cer-
tainty scored by the subjects in the second experiment.
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cont 33 1.1 ~
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cont 71 ~ 2.4
cont 40 ~ 2.1
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92 ~ 3.6 ~
29 ~r -1.5 ~
~71 ~ 1.8
2. 2.1
12 I a noinfo ~ shift 13 ~ 1.6
~
17 a quantity cont 48 ~ 2.2 ~
~- -( b relevance I cont I 77 ~ 2.8 ~
18 a implication cont 63 3 5~
b noinfo cont 65 2 9~~ -~- - ~ -- -----
16
quantity shift 27 ' 1.5
13 a quantity cont 40 ~ 3.1 ~.
~ I b noinfo ~ cont 2~ -1.8 ~r
14 a noinfo shift 35 1.6 '
~- Ib noinfo } shift ~13 T1.7
15 a implication cont 71 ~ 2.9 ~r
~- ~ b relevance I cont ~ 42 ~ 1.8 ~
a quantity cont 21 ~ 1.9 ~


















Figure 5.1: The choice of declaratives in percentages as a function of
the the source of information.
sources of information had significantly different efFects (Figure 5.1: LI:
Xd~-, - 18.2, p C 0.001, IN: Xdf-t - 28.5, p c 0.001, LN: Xd~-1 - 155,
p c 0.001. Figure 5.2: LI: p c 0.001, IN: p c 0.005, LN: p G 0.001; in
this case the sign test was applied over the mean value of the degree of
certainty per subject.)
5.5 Discussion
The results indicate two ways in which the speaker's belief about the
content of the DQ is related to the use of a D-form. Firstly, the use
of a D-form is significantly related to the degree of certainty indicated
by the subjects. When certainty about the content increases, the use of
D-forms also increases. Secondly, both the number of D-forms and the
degree of certainty show the same behaviour towards the source of infor-
mation. When we look at the dialogues separately, however, we should
be careful in our conclusions. Let us therefore consider a few dialogues












Flgure 5.i: The degree of certainty as a function of the the source of
information.
more closely.
In dialogues 5a and 5b the use of a D-form was relatively frequent in
both dialogues, scoring 79~ and 60~ respectively. The score for the cer-
tainty on the other hand is relatively low, 1.8 and 0.5 respectively. So, in
this case too, D-form and certainty show the same correlated behaviour,
but why do subjects prefer a D-form although the certainty is low com-
pared to other dialogues? Probably the high percentage of D-forms can
be explained by the form of the target part, which was the following
sentence uttered by S:
Yov don't know whether a train leaves that early?
Here, a D-form may have been preferred because of politeness. The un-
derlying rule seems to be related to Leech's approbation maxim: "min-
imize dispraise of the other" (Leech (1983~~. When an I-form is used
instead, the question is more ofFensive, almost like:
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Don't you even know whether a train leaves that early?
Such a question would be impolite in many discourse situations. Of
course a lot depends on the sentence intonation pattern, which was not
available to the subjects. Another reason could be that an I-form ex-
presses more surprise and from the dialogue it did not follow that S had
any reason to be surprised. Whatever the explanation may be, the cer-
tainty about the propositional content of the DQ is very low and the
preference for a D-form is very high, so this case is an exception to our
hypothesis that D-forms are only used in cases where certainty is high.
Note that it can easily be inferred from the declarative that the utterance
is meant as a question, because the hearer is the expert about his own
knowledge.
In dialogues lla and llb we have a significant decrease in the D-form
score (71~ and 2~ respectively) although certainty was almost equal in
both cases (1.8 and 2.1, respectively), so that a direct relation between
certainty and D-form does not seem to exist. In this case the result can
be explained by an abrupt topic change in llb. In the contextual part of
both dialogues S asks which flights are going to Helsinki. I answers the
question and then S continues with the target part (here only represented
in D-form):
11a S: The duration of the flight is about three hours?
llb S: 1 can go by bus frorri Utrecht to Schiphol?
Hence, in lla S continues talking about the flight mentioned by I,
whereas in llb, S starts talking about the trip from Utrecht to Schiphol.
So, it seems to be the case that, in contrast to Springorum's results, an
I-form is preferred when a speaker introduces an abrupt topic change.~
There is an important difference, however, in the discourse situation of
the two kinds of dialogues. In Springorum's dialogues, a doctor is di-
agnosing the patient's illness. Roughly speaking, this means that the
doctor (the expert) is asking questions until he or she has diagnosed the
9The similarity in the degree oi certainty may be explained by the fact that in both cases
no information about the content was provided during the dialogue. This is also the case in
dialogues 9 and 14. Note that dialogue 6 is an extreme exception: although the information
was not provided during the dialogue, there is a significant difference in certainty (3.7 vs. 2.0).
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case;lo in our dialogues questions were asked by the information-seeker
(the non-expert). If the doctor is supposed to be the expert, he can hide
his ignorance about the outcome of the answer by asking the question
in a D-form. Therefore the form of the utterance could be determined
by the discourse situation. In all cases the question function was eas-
ily identifiable because the doctor always `stated' something about the
physical condition of the patient, like "you haven't felt thirsty in the last
few months".
We do not have enough data, however, to verify the relation between
topic change and a less preferred use of declaratives. In the experiment
there was one case where topic recycled (dialogue 3b) and only in two
other cases topic changed, namely dialogues 4a and 6b. It is not pos-
sible to compare these directly with 11 because in all cases certainty
decreased where the topic changed, which means that the decrease of
certainty could be responsible for the decrease in D-forms. In dialogue
6b the D-form is hardly used (4~) and certainty is not high (2.0). Di-
alogue 4a seems to be in the middle (D-form: 40~, certainty: 2.5). In
dialogue 3b, however, the D-form is used in 67~ of cases and certainty is
relatively high (2.9). Therefore it seems to be the case that if an abrupt
topic change occurs, a D-form is preferred where certainty is high and
where the evidence comes literally from the discourse.
It is difficult, however, to compare dialogues which are not grouped in
pairs, because not everything can be explained from the parameters in
Table 5.1. In different dialogues entirely different inferences are usually
made to arrive at some sort of belief about the content of the statement.
A useful comparison should take account of these different inferences.
Note for instance that in dialogue 6a the highest certainty is reached
(3.7) although the use of D-forms is only 17~. On the other hand, in
dialogue lla the certainty is 1.8 and the use of D-forms is 71~. One
could suggest that the belief scale is not reliable because no fixed or
clear-cut concept of belief is involved. However, certainty increases (or
decreases) significantly when information is added (or deleted) with re-
'oNote that the same structure often occurs in natural-language human-computer dialogues.
The computer is asking questions, according to some sort of tree-etructure, until it has enough
information to provide an answer (see e.g., van Katwijk, van Nes, Bunt, Muller and Leopold
(1979)).
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spect to the content of the utterance. ( See dialogues 4, 5, 10, 15, 16, 17
and 18.) Therefore, the outcome of the certainty scale seems reasonably
reliable and useful in cases where no information is added or deleted in
the contextual part.
In the results we have seen a significant covariation between the degree
of certainty and the source of information. The information was divided
into three parts: 1. literally in the text or implication, 2. implicature and
3. world knowledge or no information. Clearly, the classification should
be refined in some cases since world knowledge may cause a strong belief
about the proposition expressed in the target. An example of this can be
found in dialogue 6a. Some of the subjects confronted afterwards with
the results stated that "everybody knows that there is a train around
11.30 from Tilburg". Of course, world knowledge is influenced by the
place where people live and is also culturally determined. On the other
hand, belief inferred by implication may be very low if the inference is
`too difficult' ( see Noordman dc Vonk (1987)).
It is unclear, however, why the use of declaratives in 6a is so low (17~).
The explanation that the information does not come from the discourse is
insufl'icient, since the use of D-forms in, for instance, dialogue lla is very
high (71~). A suggestion could be that certain syntactic constructions
are unsuitable for a declarative question; here, "There is ..." or "There
are ...".11 Note in this connection the relatively low use of declaratives
in dialogues 9a (2~), 9b (15~), 12a (13q) and 12b (27q) which have
the same constructions.
Turning to dialogue lOb (the edited dialogue C2 from the example
above), we see that in 29~ of cases a D-form is preferred, although the
ínformation about the content is not mentioned in the text. The degree
of certainty ( 1.5) also suggests that there must be some weak belief about
the content. If no information is mentioned in the text, the information
must be inferred from already existing world knowledge. The inference
could run along the following lines.
1. S says that he wants to set out from Tilburg.
2. S does not say how he will go to Schiphol.
'lIn Dutch: "Er is ..." or "Er zijn ..."
Context and the use of declarative questions 79
3. There are only two ways to get from Tilburg to Schiphol (within a
limited time~, namely by train or by car.
4. S is probably not going by car because he knows how fast he drives
and therefore it would be easier for S than for I to determine the
duration of the travel time from Tilburg to Schiphol.
5. Therefore I thinks that S will probably go by train.
In dialogue l0a the I-form sounds more redundant, because the in-
formation was already provided in the course of the dialogue. However,
the use of an I-form is not wrong; the I-form sounds at the most a little
impolite, as if no attention had been paid to what was said before. It
can be concluded about all uses of D-forms in questions, especially when
the belief about the content comes from certain background information,
that the D-form can be replaced by an I-form without affecting the di-
alogue too much. But of course not the other way around: an I-form
cannot be replaced by a D-form, without the risk of misunderstanding
the question function and the corresponding speaker's mental state.
5.6 Conclusion
From the experiments it follows that a significant relation exists between
the use of a D-form as a syntactic characteristic of a question and the
speaker's belief about the content of the question. It cannot be con-
cluded, however, that a strong belief automatically causes a declarative
form to be used and a weak belief an interrogative form.
A D-form is used in particular in those cases where information has
already been provided in the dialogue and ~ti-here the speaker doubts
certain elements of the information given; the function of these utterances
is typically verificative. If the information source is outside the dialogue
(e.g., world knowledge) a D-form can always be replaced by an I-form,
without affecting the course of the dialogue.
When attention is shifted to another topic in the dialogue, the use
of D-forms decreases in those cases where belief about the content is
weak. In cases of strong belief, topic change hardly influences the use of
D-forms.
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Sometimes a D-form is preferred when hardly any belief about the
content of the DQ is present, especially in those cases where certain
rules of politeness conflict with the use of an I-form. These D-forms can
only be used, however, when they are semantically easy to identify as
questions, so that no mistakes can be made about the question function
of the declarative.
An important question still to be answered is how the speaker's belief
can be inferred from contextual features. The inference is usually very
complex, especially when world knowledge is involved in the derivation.
The inference above, for example, where I concludes that S will probably
go by train, is by no means explicit; in this case one should also include
knowledge about times, distances, speed, cars, trains, rational behaviour,
and so on. The exact inference scheme would be very complex, which
makes the prediction of a certain belief very unreliable. Indeed, this is
of no concern to the hearer; he only identifies the belief from the use
of a declarative as a question, without bothering about the source of
the belief. But even in very simple cases, that is, when the information
is provided in the dialogue, the available formal methods of describing
dialogues and action theory are not adequate to infer this belief.




S: Good morning. Next Monday I




S: Good morning. Next Monday I
want to go by plane to
Paris,
I: Yes ...
S: and I have to be there at
about two o'clock in the
afternoon. What time do I
have to be there to arrive
in time?
I: Well, the plane leavea at
11.30 and it will arrive at
13.30 and there is another
one at ... no,
(i) You said Saturday?
(iiJ Did you say Saturday?
Dialogue 2a
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Hello, can you roughly tell
me what time the planes
arrive from Munich on Sunday
and possibly on Saturday?
I: Just a moment, please ...
I: Yes, a plane arrives at 11.50.
S: (iJ That is on Sunday?
(ii~ Is that on Sunday?
I: Yes ...
S: and I have to be there at
about two o'clock. What
time do I have to be there
to arrive in time?
I: Well, the plane leaves at
11.30 and it will arrive at
13.30 and there is another
one at ... no,
(i~ You said Monday?
(ii) Did you say Monday?
Dialogue 2b
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Hello, can you roughly tell
me what time the planes
arrive from Munich on Sunday
and possibly on Saturday?
I: Just a moment, please ...
I: Yes, a plane arrivea at 11.60.
S: (i~ That is atso on Saturday?





S: Hi, can you tell me when
planes arrive from Lyon in
Amaterdam, during the whole
week?
I: Yes, just a moment ...
I: A plane arrives at 9.55, but
not in the weekend.
S: (iJ That's the whole week but
not in the weekend?
(ii) Is that the whole week óut




S: Hi, can you tell me when
planea arrive from Lyon in
Amaterdam, during the whole
week?
I: Yes, juat a moment ...
I: A plane arrivea at 9.bb, but
not in the weekend.
S: And theae are the only
flighta?
I: Yea .
S: Do busea leave from Eindhoven
to Schiphol?
I: Yea, they do.
S: (i) That was the whole week
but not in the weekendY
(ii) Was that the whole week
óut not in the weekend?
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Dialogue 4a Dialogue 4b
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Good morning, I would like to
know what time the planea
leave from Amsterdam to
Paris, in three days.
I: One moment, please.
I: So, that is on Sunday. Then
there are several planea.
Shall I mention them all?
S: Yes, please.
I: There is a plane at 8.05, at
9.50, at 10.25, at 14.25 and
at 17.06.
S: 8.05, 9.b0, 10.25, 14.25 and
17.06.
I: Yes.
S: (:~ I have to 6e at Schiphol
one-and-a-half hours before
departure time?




S: Good morning, I would like to
know what time the planes
leave from Amsterdam to
Paris, in three days.
I: One moment, please.
I: So, that is on Sunday. Then
there are several planea.
Shall I mention them all?
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S: Yea, please.
I: There is a plane at 8.06, at
9.50, at 10.26, at 14.2b and
at 17.06 and you have to
check in one-and-a-half houra
before departure.
S: 8.Ob, 9.50, 10.25, 14.2b and
17.05.
I: Yes.
S: (i) I have to be at Sehiphol
one-and-a-half houra before
departure time?






S: Good morning, H.B. speaking.
Are there any bus servicea
from various places to
Schiphol?
I: Yes, these are ordinary KLM
buses.
S: What time do they leave from
Eindhoven and can I use them
when I want to pick someone
up and didn't book myself?
I: That is no problem, but I
don't have any time schedules
about buses here. In that
case, you have to call
another number.
S: (i) You don't know whether
they leave early in the morn-
ing?
(ii) Don't you know whether





S: Good morning, H.B. speaking.
Are there any bus servicea
from various placea to
Schiphol?
I: Yea, these are ordinary KLM
buses.
S: What time do they leave from
Eindhoven and can I use them
when I wnnt to pick someone
up and didn't book myself?
I: That is no problem, they leave
every hour from Eindhoven.
S: (i) You don't know how long
they take?
(ii) Don't you know how long
they take?
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Dialogue 8a
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Good morning, R.A. speaking.
Next Thuraday, I would like
to go to Montreal. I don't
know the flight number, is
that KL 671 or 571?
I: That is KL 671.
S: 671?
I: Yes.
S: And what time do I have to
leave from Tilburg by train
to catch that flight, do you
have any idea about that?
I: Well, your plane leavea at
14.40 and you have to check
in one-and-a-half hours
before and the trip from
Tilburg takes about one-and-
a-half hours. So, if you
leave three hours before ...
S: (i) There is a train leaving at
11.~0 Jrom Tilóurg?




S: Good morning, R.A speaking.
Next Thursday, I would like
to go to Montreal. I don't
know the flight number, is
that KL 671 or b71?
I: That is KL 671.
S: 671?
I: Yes.
S: And what time do I have to
leave from Tilburg by train
to catch that flight, do you
have any idea about that?
I: Well, your plane leaves at
14.40 and you have to check
in one-and-a-half hours
before and the trip from
Tilburg takes about one-and-
a-half hours. So, if you
leave three hours before ...
S: (i) Special KLM óuses leave
Jrom Den Haag to Schiphol7
(ii) Do special KLM buses






S: Good afternoon, I have a
question about the arrival
time of planes from Lyon. I
am expecting someone vho
arrives this afternoon or
tomorrow. What time do
planes arrive from Lyon?
I: Just a moment, please.
I: There is a plane at 9.55.
S: (i) That is tomorrow morn-
ing?




S: Good morning, I would like to
know the arrival time of the
plane from Nice, flight
number KL 338.
I: (i) That is today?




S: Good afternoon, I have a
queation about the arrival
time of planea from Lyon. I
am expecting someone rho
arrivea this afternoon. What
time do planea arrive from
Lyon?
I: Just a moment, pleaee.
I: There ia a plane at 9.5b.
S: (i) That is tomorrow morn-
ing?




S: Good morning, I rould like to
knor the arrival time of the
plane from Nice, flight
number KL 338.
I: (i) That was yesterday?
(ii) Was that yesterday?
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Dialogue 9a
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Good morning, this is F.D.
Next week, Tuesday, a plane
will be leaving for Prague.
That is the KL 281 or KL 282.
What time doea that plane
leave?
I: You saàd Tueaday?
S: Yes.
I: The plane leaves at 9.2b and
it is the KL 281.
S: Then I would like to have a
connection with the train
from Tilburg. What time do I
have to catch the train in
Tilburg?
I: Yes, you have to check in
one-and-a-half hours before
and the train takes about one
hour and forty minutes.
S: (:J There is a train that leaves
that early?





S: Good morning, this is F.D.
Next week, Tueaday, a plane
will be leaving for Prague.
That is the KL 281 or KL 282.
What time doea that plane
leave?
I: You said Tueaday?
S: Yes.
I: The plane leavea at 9.26 and
it is the KL 281.
S: Then I would like to have a
connection with the train from
Tilburg. What time do I have
to catch the train in Tilburg?
I: Yes, then you have to catch an
early train. You have to be
there at about eight and the
train takea about one hour and
forty minutes.
S: (i) There is a train that leavea
that early?





S: Good morning, this ia H.K.
Next reek I am going by plane
to Montreal, I don't know the
flight number, KL 671 or KL
571. Can you tell me what time
I have to catch the train in
The Hague to be in time at
Schiphol?
I: Your flight is KL 671.
S: Yes.
I: And it will leave at 14.40
(i) You would like to come by
train?




S: Hello, this ia G.M. I have to
go to Helsinki, from Amsterdam.
Can you tell me which flights
leave next Sunday?
I: Just a moment.
I: Yea, there are several
flights. One that leavea at
9.10, one at 11.10 and one at
17.30.
S: (iJ The fiight takes about
three hours?





S: Good morning, thia ia H.K.
Next reek I am going by plane
to Montreal, I don't know the
flight number, KL 671 or KL
571. Can you tell me rhat time
I have to leave The Hague to be
in time at Schiphol?
I: Your flight is KL 871.
S: Yes.
I: And it will leave at 14.40
(i~ You would like to come 6y
train?




S: Hello, this is G.M. I have to
go to Helainki, from Amaterdam.
Can you tell me which flights
leave next Sunday?
I: Just a moment.
I: Yes, there are several
flights. One that leavea at
9.10, one at 11.10 and one at
17.30.
S: (i~ I can go by bus from Eind-
hoven to Schiphol?
(ii) Can I go by bus ~rom
Eindhoven to Schiphol?
Conteact and the use of declarative questions
Dialogue 12a
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Hello, this is H.P. I have to
go to Helsinki, from Amaterdam.
Can you tell me which flights
leave next Sunday?
I: Just a moment.
I: Yes, there are several
flighta. One that leavea at
9.10, one at 11.10 and one at
17.30.
S: The 1light takea about three
houra?
I: You will arrive at 13.25 if
you take the firat one. So
that fa about four houre.
S: Four houra?
I: Yea, that's because of the
stops.
S: (i) There ia aJso a non-atop
flight 8




S: Hello, this is H.P. I have to
go to Helsinki, from Amaterdam.
Can you tell me which flights
leave next Sunday?
I: Just a moment.
I: Yea, there are eeveral
flighta. One that leaves at
9.10, one at 11.10 and one at
17.30.
S: The flight takea about three
houra?
I: You will arrive at 13.2b if
you take the firat one. So
that is about four houra.
S: Four houra?
I: Yes, that's becauae of the
atops.
S: (i) There ia no non-atop
fiight?






S: Hello, I have to pick someone
up who's arriving by plane from
Dublin, in two days. Can you
tell me something about arrival
times of those flights?
I: Just a moment.
I: There is a flight at 8.00 in
the morning and 8.45 in the
evening.
S: (i) These are the only ftights?
(ii) Are these the only tlights?
Dialogue 14a
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Hello, J. speaking. Can you
tell me what time the plane
from Munich arrives?
I: Yes, today or ...?
S: Yes.
I: Let me see.
S: Sure.
I: There is one at 11.50, 16.5b
and 21.50.
S: Yes, (i) The schedule in the week-
end is the same?





S: Hello, I have to pick someone
up who's arriving by plane from
Dublin, in two daya. Can you
tell me something about arrival
times of those flighta?
I: Juat a moment.
I: There ia a flight at 8.00 in
the morning and 8.45 in the
evening.
S: (i) There are also other
fiights?




S: Hello, J. speaking. Can you
tell me what time the plane
from Munich arrives?
I: Yea, today or ...?
S: Yes.
I: Let me see.
S: Sure.
I: There is one at 11.50, 16.b5
and 21.50.
S: Yes, (i) The schedule in the week-
end is different?
(ii) Is the schedule in the
weekend different?
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Dialogue 15a
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Hello, I would like to have
some information. What's the
arrival time of airplanes from
Dublin, roughly?
I: Well, it depends on the day of
the week of course. What day
would you like to know?
5: Saturday and Sunday.
I: Saturday and Sunday. On
Saturday there ia one at 11.45
and Sunday at 20.05 and 16.15.
S: (i) That's three fiights in two
days?





S: Hello, I would like to have
some information. What's the
arrival times of airplanes from
Dublin, roughly?
I: Well, it depends on the day of
the week of course. What day
would you like to know?
S: Saturday and Sunday.
I: There is one at 11.45, at
20.05 and at 16.15.
S: (i~ That's three fiights in two
days?





S: Good morning, A. speaking. I
want to ask you whether you
know anything about arrival
times of airplanes from Lyon
I: Sure .
S: on Friday, next Friday.
I: Just a moment.
I: There is a flight at 9.5b in
the morning.
S: (i) That is the only fíight that
day?




S: Hello, D.R. apeaking. I
would like to know how many
flights arrive from Munich, and
their arrival time, please.
I: Just a moment.
I: There are three flights a day.
One that arrivea at 11.50, one
at 16.55, and one at 21.b0.
S: (if That is today and tomor-
row?





S: Cood morning, A. apeaking. I
want to ask you whether you
know anything about arrival
times of airplanea from Lyon
I: Sure .
S: on Friday, next Friday.
I: Just a moment.
I: There ia only a flight at 9.b5
in the morning.
S: (~J That is the only ftight that
day?




S: Hello, D.R. apeaking. I
would like to know hov many
flighta arrive today and
tomorrow from Munich, and their
arrival time, please.
I: Just a moment.
I: There are three flighta a day.
One that arrives at 11.50, one
at 16.55, and one at 21.50.
S: (i~ That is today and tomor-
row?
(ii~ Is thnt today and tomor-
row?
Context and the use of declarative questions
Dialogue 18a
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Hello this is R.J. I booked a
flight to Los Angeles for next
week, Tuesday. I don't know,
was it KL402 or KL 601?
I: KL 601 .
S: KL 601. And what time does
it leave?
I: At 14.50.
S: How long before do I have to
be at Schiphol?
I: You have to check in
one-and-a-half hours before.
S: (s~ That means that I have to
be there around 13.90?
(iiJ Does that mean that




S: Hello this is R.J. I booked a
flight to Los Angeles for next
week, tueaday. I don't knov,
was it KL402 or KL 601?
I: KL 601 .
S: KL 601. And what time doea
it leave?
I: At 14.50.
S: ~if That means that I have to
be there around 13.90?
(ii~ Does that mean that








~This chapter has óeen accepted for publication in: Bunt, H.G'. f9 van Hout, R. (Eds.)
(1989~ Language Technofogy. Dordrecht: Foris Publications ( To appear in 1989J~~
abstract
Communicative acts in natural language dialogues can be regarded as intentional acts
performed by a dialogue participant to influence the relevant aspects of the mental
state of a recipient. In this paper a framework is discussed for deriving the beliefs and
intentions of a speaker from the performance of a certain act. To this end, the com-
municative act is expressed in terms of prosodic and textual features of the utterance
and connected by means of default rules to the conditions that must be fulfilfed by
a speaker in order to perform the act felicitously. These conditions are expressed in
terms of the beliefs and intentions of the speaker and may be compared with Searle's
felicity conditions on speech acts. It is argued, though, that some felicity conditions
can be derived from a formalization of general principles of rational and cooperative
behaviour in information dialogues.
6.1 Introduction
In Levinson (1983) it is argued that a promising approach for speech act
theory would be one in which speech act.s are characterized in terms of
their context-changing effects. In this approach (Isard (1975); Stalnaker
(1978); Gazdar (1981); Bunt (1989a)) context is limited to mental states
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of the participants (in terms of beliefs, expectations, wants, intentions,
etc.) and an illocutionary act is taken as a function that changes one
context into another. For instance, the performance of a promise can
cause a change in a speaker's `mental' state from one in which he is not
committed to a certain future act (context K) into one in which he is
(context K'). An order changes a context from one in which a hearer is
not required by a speaker to do a future act into one in which the hearer
is so required.
In Bunt (1989a) the idea of a context change is formalized and the
effects of a communicative act' (CA) in a dialogue situation are repre-
sented as follows:
(1) K-~ Kz, Ky ~~ K' -~ KZ, K~ ~
where Ki and Ky are the respective new mental states of the agents x and
y resulting from the communicative act. The CA is viewed as a function
from a context ( i.e. the context before the performance of the act) to a
new context (i.e. the context after the performance of the act). In other
words, CA(K) - CA(c Kz, Ky ~) -C Ks, Ky ~- K', which agrees with
Gazdar's proposal ( Gazdar ( 1981)), where illocutionary acts are partial
functions from contexts into contexts.
Although the `context-change' approach of speech acts seems to offer
an attractive formal treatment of inental state changes of dialogue par-
ticipants, there are still many problems to be solved (see e.g., Levinson
(1983)). In this paper, we will concentrate on one of these problems,
namely how relevant parts of the speaker's mental state can be linked
to the linguistic features of the utterance and how a hearer can recog-
nize this state from the speaker's utterance. To answer these questions,
we will first go into Bunt's theory in more detail and we will illustrate
certain aspects of the theory. In line with Bunt, we will assume that
recognition of the act implies recognition of its felicity conditions (i.e.
the conditions that must be satisfied by a speaker's mental state in or-
der to perform the act). Next, a belief and intention framework will be
sketched to identify the felicity conditions of a certain utterance from its
prosodic, textual and contextual features. This framework is based on
'The notion of `communicative act' is taken from Allwood (1976) as oppoaed to 'speech act'
to broaden the interactive media.
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an application of default rules and is amply inspired by Perrault's (1989)
work on an application of default logic in speech act theory.
We will presume that a speaker's intention is always to make some-
thing true in a certain state of affairs. For instance, a speaker wants
a hearer to believe a proposition or wants a hearer to believe that the
speaker wants to know something. To achieve this, a speaker plans an
utterance (see e.g., Appelt (1981); Pollack (1989) on the planning of
utterances) and tries to compose a sentence with certain syntactic and
semantic characteristics.
The other side of this phenomenon is, how can a hearer infer the inten-
tions of the speaker? In other words, what strategy does a hearer use to
discover the speaker's intentions from an utterance and its circumstances.
Previous studies (e.g., Allen óc Perrault (1980); Kautz (1989)) usually
concentrate on the recognition of the speaker's plan, in terms of goals
and future actions, but are hardly based on linguistic knowledge. In this
paper it is not our aim to give a plan-based analysis of the recognition
of the goals of a speaker; instead, we will concentrate on the identifi-
cation of a communicative act or, more precisely, a speaker's intended
information transfer, from the linguistic features of the utterance.
6.2 Communicative acts as context-changing func-
tions
In Bunt's theory (1989a), in line with Gazdar (1981) and Searle (1969), a
communicative function is applied to a(propositional) content c, yield-
ing a communicative act: G"F(c) - CA. Successful communication is
accomplished if the felicity conditions, FC~A(c), of the communicative
act are recognized by the recipient and if the conditions become mutual
belief (MB),2 for if the recipient understands the communicative act, he
knows the preconditions that go with it and he therefore believes that
the speaker's mental state fulfills the conditions to perform the act. If,
on the other hand, the speaker believes that he is observed by the re-
2Bunt suggests building in two kinds of belief, a strong and a weak version (respectively,
know and susyecl), to describe the effects on the mental states of the participants. Since the
difference between these two kinds of belief plays no role in this section, they will fuee into one
modal belief operator (B).
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cipient, he will assume, if there is no evidence to the contrary, that the
recipient believes that the speaker fulfills the preconditions, and so on.
So, the added information after the performance of the speech act is:
(2) MBz,yFCCA(c)
That is, after the communicative act CA with preconditions FC~A(c),
the agents x and y mutually believe that the preconditions hold. In other
words, what an utterance communicates is its felicity conditions.
As we have seen already, CA was treated as a function from the `old'
context to the `new' context:3 CA(K) - K'. The contextual change
caused by the speech act CA can be written as:
(3) CA(K) - update(K, {MB~,yFC~A(c)})
Here an update function is introduced which contains two arguments: a.
the old mental states of the agents and b. a set of beliefs with which
the old mental state should be updated. Bunt argues that, in general,
consistency maintenance and revision of inental states should be taken
into account ( see also Bunt ( 1989b)), but that in the simplest case these
beliefs can be added to the already present state, that is:
(4) CA(K) -cKx U {BsMBx,yFCCA(c)},
Ky U {By1~By yFlipA(C)} i
Simply adding propositions to a previous context is inadequate in most
cases, since new propositions can influence old ones. Clearly, some of
these propositions play an active part during the dialogue (`memory')
and some are more volatile. This can be modelled by the addition of
sequential or temporal aspects ( see section 6.5.1).
Bunt gives a taxonomy of communicative functions, based on three
different types of intentions that may underly communicative acts in in-
formation dialogues: 1. a speaker wants to know something, 2. a speaker
wants to make known something, or 3. a speaker knows that the hearer
wants to know something. The functions are represented in a hierar-
chical structure, indicating that one function is more specific than the
other in terms of felicity conditions. For instance, a checkis more specific
'It should be noted that CA is a partial function, because it can only be applied to contexts
where one of the participants fulfills the preconditions to perform the speech act.
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than a yes~no-question because the check has the extra condition that
the speaker has a supposition about the content of the utterance.
An important issue still to be addressed is how linguistic features of ut-
terances correspond to communicative functions. An obvious linguistic
candidate that discloses the function is the appearance of an explicit per-
formative in the utterance. In natural dialogue, however, performatives
are rarely used and it is not to be expected that a one-to-one relation
will ever be found between sentence features and the meaning of perfor-
mative verbs (see e.g., Huddleston (1976); Levinson (1983)); the relation
will especially be hampered by the influence of contextual features.
Here in line with Cohen and Levesque (1989b), we will avoid illocu-
tionary labelling and attempt to determine the attitudes directly from
the linguistic features of the utterance. Communicative functions will be
expressed in terms of observable features of the utterance and only those
features will be taken into account that contribute to revealing particu-
lar attitudes of the speaker, in terms of belief and intentions, towards a
certain proposition. For that purpose, a framework will be introduced
to represent beliefs, intentions and actions of an agent. Communicative
acts will be considered as `normal' actions, i.e. intentionally performed
to change certain aspects of the world. To represent the consequences of
a communicative act, we will use Perrault's application of default logic
to speech act theory. In particular, default rules will be used to include
contextual dependency and to reason without complete knowledge.
6.3 A framework for representing communicative
acts
6.3.1 A definition of the language
To represent that an agent performs actions and has certain beliefs and
intentions, we will introduce a language L. The expressions DOza, BIp,
W B~p, and Ixp are of type Proposition. They are read as `x performs
action a', `z believes that p', `z has a weak belief that p' and `z intends
to make true that p', respectively. a is of type Action, Obs(z) is of type
Action denoting the action of observing the agent x. Weak belief ( WB)
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is included to express people's uncertainty about some proposition and
is mainly used in relation to verifications (Bunt (1989a); Beun (1988b)).
BTp will be used as a shorthand notation for Bxp V BI~p, and can be
read as `z has a belief about p'.
We will assume t.hat belief (B) possesses the properties of the standard
weak S5 axioms (see e.g., Hughes dt Cresswell (1968)):
Consistency ~ Bzp -~ ~Bx~p
Closure ~ BzpócBZ(p ~ q) -~ Bxq
Negative Introspection h- ~BZp --~ B2~Bxp
Positive Introspection ~ Bxp -~ BZBxp
These rules are closed under the principle:
Necessitation If 1- p then Bxp
where p is an axiom of (standard) propositional logic.
Note that the axiom BZp --~ p is not included because we want to
make it possible that an agent has incorrect information about the `real'
world. To indicate a common belief of two agents, we will use mutual
belief MBsyp (which is equivalent to Bzp óc Byp dt BzByp dc ByBxp dc
...). Note that a one-sided version BMBxyp (equivalent to Btp óe B~Byp
8c BzByBxp óc ...) can be expressed in terms of mutual belief when the
`Closure' axiom and `Necessitation' rule are assumed:
(5) BMByyp y--~ B~pBcBxMBzyp
The intention operator (I) is introduced, as opposed to `desire' or
`want', to concentrate on the goal-directed behaviour of the participants
in information dialogues. If S intends to do communicative act a, then S
has decided to do a, ~vhich is clearly not the case with a desire. Bratman
(1989) argues that desires can be inconsistent with someone's belief; but
that intentions are always assumed to be consistent. He distinguishes
two concepts of intention: first, to characterize an agent's actions, and
second, to characterize an agent's mental state. In our framework, inten-
tion should be considered as the decision of an agent to achieve a certain
state of affairs, and can thus be seen as a description of an agent's mental
state (namely the intended state).
We will assume that a rational agent does not intend to do superfluous
acts. In other words, if an agent intends to achieve a situation in which p
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is true, he does not believe that p is already true. The axiom expressing
this (BI1) can be seen as an extreme form of Allwood's principle of
adequacy: "Try to act as adequately and efficiently as possible to achieve
your intended purpose" (Allwood (1976): pp. 49). It would be very
inadequate of an agent if he tried to achieve a certain goa] which he
believed has alread,y been achieved.
Also, intentions are supposed to be consistent with the agent's belief;
so, if the agent intends to achieve a situation in which p is true and he
believes that from p follows q he does not intend to achieve a situation
in which q is not true (BI2). Intentions and belief are related in the
following axioms:
BI1 f- 12p -a ~B~p
BI2 F IxpdcBx(p --~ 4) -i
BI3 f- Ixp -f Bzlxp
BI4 f- ~Ixp -. Bx~Ixp
BI3 and BI4 are added to express the agent's introspective view on his
intentíons. 1~loreover, we will assume that if the agent intends to achieve
a situation in which p is true and intends to achieve a situation in which
q is true, this equals the agent's intention to achieve a situation in which
both p and q are true.
I1 1- Izpdelxq H Iy(póc9)
Note that by means of rule BI2, an agent will never intend both p and
~p (jaT~óLBx(1~ ~ p) ~ ~Iz~7~).
Now, let us define how the linguistic features of the communicative act
should be built into the framework. By considering CAs as special in-
stances of actions, the performance by x of the communicative act G'A
can be expressed as DOZ(G'A). In line with Bunt (1989a) a CA will be
viewed as a communicative function (CF) applied to a semantic content
(cont). To avoid unnecessary complexity, the semantic content will be
restricted here to propositions only.
(6) CA : Application(fun: CF, arg: cont)4
'The notation is taken (rom Bunt (1985) and is principally used to ehow the internal structure
of the expression.
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A communicative function is denoted by a tuple called function struc-
ture ( Fstruc), consisting of the utterance features: sentence type (sentt),
particle ( part) and prosodics ( pros).
(7) CF : Fstruc(sentt: s, part: pa, pros: pr)
Fstruc(sentt: s, part: pa, pros: pr) denotes a function which can be ap-
plied to propositions to yield an action. In the examples below, sentence
type, particles and prosodics will be restricted to the following values:s
(8) sentence type E {declarative, interrogative}
particle E {wel, dus, nil}
prosodics E {final[~], final[-], nil}
The value `nil' indicates that information about a particular value is
absent. The values `final[f]' and `final[-]' indicate a final rise and fall,
respectively, in the intonation pattern of the utterance. If prosodic fea-
tures are not avaílable, for instance in written discourse, `final[-~]' and
`final[-]' may indicate punctuation, here `question mark' and `full stop',
respectively. It should be mentioned, however, that this is a simplifi-
cation, since the functions of the prosodic markers and punctuation in
natural discourse often do not agree. Actually, this would force us to
introduce a new field in the function structure; for simplicity, we will
leave that out here.
For the same reason, we will not allow the possibility of more than
one particle in a sentence. Particles may carry prosodic information; in
cases where the meaning of a particle depends on its accentuation, `[f]'
or `[-]' will be added to indicate whether it is accentuated or not. If
no information is available about the prosodics of the particle, the extra
field will simply be left out.
CA is of type action; D02(CA) is true if z performs the communica-
tive act CA. For instance, if speaker S utters the sentence "Só, John is
drunk.", this will be represented by the following expression:




'If necessary, more values can be used to express the act, e.g. the occurrence of performative
verbs. In the examp]es that follow, we will use only the values represented in (8~.
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where p is the proposition that John is drunk, represented, for example,
by ~2(Drunk'(x)dcx - John'). Below, a shorthand notation will be used.
For instance, (9) will be represented as:
(10) DOS(c dec, so[~), final[-~, p))
6.3.2 Perrault's theory of defaults and speech acts
In Perrault (1989) a default logic (due to Reiter (1980)) is introduced to
specify speech act consequences. Consequences from an utterance can
be inferred only as long as they they do not contradict the context of the
utterance. If, for instance, a speaker utters a declarative with content p
then the hearer can come to believe that p is true as long as he cannot
find any proof for the contrary (e.g., the hearer believes not p at the
moment of uttering, or the hearer believes that the speaker is lying or
ironical). An advantage of this approach is that consequences can be
inferred without having to specify all the possible (counter-)arguments.
A default theory consists of a set of default rules D and a set of
assumptions W of well-formed formulas (for instance, in our language




where p is the prerequisite and q the consequent of the rule, `Mq' ex-
presses that q is possible given a certain set of beliefs. Normal defaults
are abbreviated as p~ q, and intended to mean that if p is believed, q
is believed as long as q is consistent with what is believed. Default rules
should be seen as rules of inference, like Modus Ponens, rather than ax-
ioms. The closure of a default theory is called an extensio~i and contains:
1. the assumptions W, 2. the closure under logical consequence, and '3.
the consequents of the default rules as long as the extension does not
contain the negation of the consequent. (For more details, see Reiter
(1980).)
A temporal aspect is added to propositional attitudes; for instance, Bz,tp
means that x believes p at time t. The addition of time motivates two new
axioms expressing that agents remember their beliefs over time (Mem-
ory) and continue to hold them (Persistence).
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Persistence F BI,c-~1BZ,cp ~ BZ,ttlp
Memory ~ Bx,ep ---~ BZ,ctiBz,cp
The notion of communication is explicitly built into the `Observability'
axiom expressing that if agent y performed an action a and another
agent z was observing y, z believes that y was performing the act.
Observability ~ DOy,caócDOz,LOBS(y) y Bz,tt1DOy,ca
Formally, z and y need not be different; however, communication is only
achieved when z and y differ. The axiom is oversimplified because agents
rather than actions are observed. This is of no concern here.
Perrault also suggests two default rules. Belief from another agent
will be taken over as long as this new belief is consistent with the ones
already held (Belief transfer), and the content of a declarative utterance
is believed to be true (Declarative rule).
Belief transfer Bx,cBy,tp ~ BZ,tp
Declarative rule DOy,tp. ~ Bx,cp
Here p. is the action of uttering a declarative with content p. Default
rules are closed under belief by a meta-rule:
if p~ q is a default rule, then so is B2,cp ~ Bx,t4
Now, Perrault is able to make predictions for the update of the existing
context when the usual preconditions of speech acts do not obtain (e.g.,
in cases of lies or irony). Important to note is that the context will be
updated by inferences based on the utterance and its previous context.
For instance, suppose that a speaker S utters a declarative with content
p, and a hearer H, who observes S, believes that S is lying. In that case,
the default inference from the `Declarative rule' that S believes p will be
blocked, since H believes that S believes not p and therefore H will not
come to believe that p is the case.
The (non-monotonic) default rules in Perrault's theory seem to cor-
respond to a formalization of standard pragmatic inferences. In non-
monotonic reasoning, inferences can be made without complete knowl-
edge of the circumstances. In a classical monotonic system, we could for
instance have the following axiom: DOs,cp.dc~LY(z) -~ BZ,tp, (a speaker
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believes the content of an uttered declarative unless he is lying). From
this axiom it can only be inferred that the speaker believes p if it is explic-
itly known that the speaker is not lying. By contrast, in non-monotonic
reasoning the consequent can be inferred unless it can be proved that the
hearer is lying; therefore, the consequent can be inferred in the absence
of any belief about the speaker's lying.
In Appelt 8c Konolige (1988) an alternative proposal is put forward
which replaces Reiter's default logic by an extended version of Moore's
autoepistemic logic (Moore (1985)) in which the rules generate hierar-
chical sets of extensions to incorporate preferences among defaults. We
will also use a notion of priority of defaults which differs from Appelt 8c
Konolige's proposal in that priority will be built into the default rules
themselves, where Appelt. fr Konolige build priority into a hierachical
structure of subtheories.
6.4 Mental state and utterance features
In this and the following section we would like to discuss how dingui9tic
and contextual features of utterances reveal certain aspects of the mental
state of the speaker. The following linguistic information will be con-
sidered: sentence type, particles and prosodics. Contextual information
will be restricted to the belief among the dialogue participants as to who
is the expert on the topic of the utterance. This belief plays an essential
role in the determination of a declarative as a question.
We will assume that the participants behave rationally and coopera-
tively. To express this behaviour in our language L, we will formalize the
Gricean maxims of `quality' and `quantity' (Grice (1975)) using the pre-
viously defined axioms and newly introduced default rules. An important
advantage of formalizing these maxims is that the FCs of a particular
communicative act can be drastically simplified.
It was already discussed that no one-to-one relation has been found
between linguistic features and illocutionary acts. The same is true of
linguistic features and mental states. For instance, depending on the
circumstances, a declarative with content p can be used if the speaker
has the intention to let the hearer believe that p is true, or a speaker
may have the intention to let the hearer believe that the speaker believes
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p, or a speaker may even have the intention to know the value of p.
Here, default rules will play an important role, because they enable
us to express that in uttering a declarative a speaker usv,ally intends
the hearer to believe its content. Only in cases where it can explicitly
be proved that this is not the case will this interpretation be rejected.
Therefore, we will speak of a preferred set of felicity conditions as a
mental state description rather than as a direct or indirect interpretation
of a communicative act. Different FCs will be hierarchically linked to
the linguistic features of the utterance. Although the preferred set of
a simple declarative (i.e., of DOy(C dec, nil, nil, p 1)) is closely related
to its usual direct interpretation, it is important to note that we do not
take the view that less preferred sets have to be considered as indirect
(Searle (1975)). Searle calculates the indirect act from the direct one;
here, we will see that if a preferred set of FCs is inconsistent with, for
instance, prior knowledge, the set is rejected by means of the application
of inference rules in a certain order before it is even calculated.
6.4.1 Sentence type and felicity conditions
The question is now which preferred set of FCs can be related to the
declarative or interrogative sentence type. Before we try to answer this,
let us make two assumptions. Firstly, we will assume that a simple
declarative agrees with a statement interpretation and a simple inter-
rogative (i.e., DOS ( c int, nil, nil, p~)) with a question interpretation.
Secondly, we will assume that in all cases the speaker has the intention
that the hearer should believe something: if the utterance is declarative,
the speaker intends the hearer to believe the content of the utterance;ó if
interrogative, the speaker intends the hearer to believe that the speaker
wants to know something.
The interrogative case partly agrees with Searle's ( 1969) FCs on ques-
tioning. In this paper, the `preparatory' condition on questioning, viz.
that the speaker does not know the answer, follows from the axiom IB1:
if x has the intention to make p true, x does not belief that p is true at
~This choice is based on results from earlier recorded dialogues where information was ex-
changed about the arrival and departure times of aircraft and trains (see e.g., Beun dc Bunt
(1987)). In other situations, it may be preferred that, for instance, the speaker intends the
hearer to believe that the speaker óelieves lhat p.
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that moment.
(11) Ixp ~ ~Bxp
Now, if z is replaced by S and p by Bsp, i.e. the speaker has the intention
to know the value of p(IsBsp), it follows from (11) that S does not
believe that S believes whether p:
(12) jsBsp -~ -,ByBsp
From the consequence of (12) it can easily be proved by means of the `be-
lief' axioms that the speaker has no belief about p(~Bsp) and therefore
Searle's preparatory condition is superfluous.
Just as in the case of an interrogative (or question) the speaker's
ignorance about p can be inferred from aspects of the agent's rational
behaviour (axiom IB1), the speaker's belief that p is true can be inferred
from the Gricean maxim of quality (Grice (1975)) in the case of a declar-
ative. This is expressed in (13): if S has the intention to let H believe
that p is true, S believes that p is true by default.
(13) Quality IsBxp ~ Bsp
A derived form of the quantity maxim follows from (11), i.e. a speaker
does not transfer information that is already known to the hearer.
(14) Quantity ISBHp -~ ~BSBHp
Or, with contraposition, if a speaker believes that the hearer believes p,
the speaker will never have the intention to make true that the hearer
believes p. Now, the following preferred set of felicity conditions holds
in the case of a simple declarative and a simple interrogative:
declarative: FC~(p) - IsBHp
interrogative: FC;(p) - IyBylsBsp
6.4.2 The application of default rules
We will now show how default rules can be applied to determine the
transferred package of felicity conditions. In many cases, a crucial role
is played by the priorities of default rules. We will say that:
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Default rule ~ has priority over rule ~i iff the consequent of ~c~i can 6e
inferred only in case the conseguent of ~ is false.
For instance, it can easily be verified that rule (15a) has priority over
rule (15b) and that both (15a) and (15b) have priority over (15c):
(15a) p ~ q
(15b) p8~~q ~ r
(15c~ ~q8t~r ~ m
We formulate default rules where the communicative act is represented
in the prerequisite of the rule, the preferred package of felicity condi-
tions in the consequent. So, if a speaker utters a simple declarative or
interrogative, respectively, it can be inferred by default that the felicity
conditions FCd(p) or FCi(p) hold.
(16) DOs(G dec, nil, nil, p~) ~ ISBHp
(17~ DOs(G int, nil, nil, p 1) ~ ISBxIsBsp
In the expressions below the following abbreviations will be used:
STATE - ISBHp
QUE - IsBxlsBsp
Empirically, a`statement' interpretation of declaratives is preferred; how-
ever, a declarative can be used for questioning even without any overt
question indicators. In Beun (1989) it was shown that no more than
50~ of Dutch declarative questions in spoken dialogues possessed an
overt question indicator. Therefore it is desirable to be able to infer
both interpretations, with a preference for the statement, i.e. a declar-
ative is interpreted as a statement as long as no evidence exists to the
contrary. Only if it can be proved that ~IsBHp can the `question' func-
tion be chosen and only then should the `statement' interpretation be
rejected.
In Beun (1988b), it was shown experimentally that questions in Dutch
with a declarative sentence type usually have a verificative function, i.e.
apart from the usual felicity conditions of the interrogative (FC;(p)) the
speaker intentionally communicates that he suspects that p(WBsp).
Now, the second interpretation of the declarative can be written as:
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(16a) DOS(C dec, nil, nil, p~)óc~STATE ~ QUEdcISBHWBsp
To infer the consequent of (16a) it should explicitly be proved that the
speaker does not have the intention to let the hearer believe that p is
true, which is always true if the consequent of (16) is rejected. This
implies that (16) has priority over (16a).
Depending on the discourse situation other functions may be found
as well, for instance, marking a topic change (Springorum (1986)) or
showing politeness (Beun (1988b)), although the verificative function
is preferred. If the speaker has no suspicion about the content of the
declarative question a third default rule could be applied:
(16b) DOS(c dec, nil, nil, p~)óc~STATEBc~ISBHWBsp ~ QUE
Again, the consequent of (16b) can be inferred only if the consequents of
(16) and (16a) cannot be inferred and therefore the latter have priority.
It is important to note that the inference in (16) cannot be made by or-
dinary implication. (18) as a replacement is problematic because ~QUE
must explicitly be proved to infer the consequence, which is impossible
in most realistic cases.
(18) DOS(C dec, nil, nil, p~)Bc~QUE -~ STATE
Also (19) is unacceptable, because in all cases STATE would be inferred
if the speaker utters a declarative, even if it is already known by the
hearer that ~STATE.
(19) DOs ( C dec, nil, nil, p 1) ~ STATE
6.4.3 Other linguistic features
Final rise
An important feature revealing the question function of a declarative is a
final rise in intonation, although not all declaratives with a final rise are
meant as questions (Geluykens (1987)). Most declaratives with a final
rise can be given a question interpretation; only in those cases where
it can be proved that the utterance is not a question will a statement
interpretation be selected. This can be expressed by the following default
rules:
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(20a) DOS(c dec,nil, final[~-],p )) ~ QUEÓcISBHWBsp
(20b) DOS(c dec,nil, final[~-],p 1)dc~QUE ~ STATE
In this case the meaning of the final rise is expressed in the change of
priority of the default rules from statement to question interpretation.
The particle `dus' (`so')
In Beun (1988a) it was demonstrated that if the Dutch particle dus (so)
was added to an utterance which was interpreted as a statement in the
absence of the particle~ (no punctuation or prosodic information being
available), the addition of the particle turns the utterance interpretation
into a question. The presence of the particle therefore turns the priority
from statement to question interpretation.
(21a) DOS(c dec, dus, nil, p 1) ~ QUEdcISBHWBsp
(21b) DOS(c dec, dus, nil, p~)Bc~QUE ~ STATE
The meaning of the particle is also hidden in the application of the default
rules. A further analysis of dus will not be pursued, since our framework
is far from sufficient to account properly for the information that can be
expressed by the particle.
The particle `wel'
This example shows how the difference between an accentuated and non-
accentuated use of a particle can be expressed in the consequent of the
default rules. In Abraham (1984) more than 15 different meanings of the
Dutch particle wel are described, depending on its use in interrogatives,
declaratives, stressed, unstressed and so on. A subset will be selected
and adapted to the framework here.
A speaker indicates intentionally in a declarative sentence with accen-
tuated wel and final fall, in addition to his belief concerning the propo-
sition p, the belief that the hearer believes not p:
(22a) DOS(c dec,wel[-~], final[-],p 1) ~ STATEBcISBHBSBH~p
'Actually, `statement' is a simplification. The subjects were asked to decide whether the ut-
terance was a question or an answer. Hence, `atatement' agrees with an `answer' interpretation.
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If a final rise is present in the utterance, the utterance gets a question
interpretation. The speaker adds intentionally to QUE his belief that
the hearer believes that p is true, that the speaker has a weak belief that
p is true and that the speaker believed before that not p. (To indicate
the latter proposition we will use the expression Before(Bs~p).8)
(22b) DOs(G dec,wel[f], final[-}-],p )) ~ QUEdc
IS BH ( BS BHp~
W Bspóc
Be f ore(Bs~p))
In this case the difference in the interpretations of the interrogative and
declarative sentence type is too subtle to represent in our framework.
Therefore, both interpretations are considered as being equal:




If the particle is not accentuated in the interrogative case, the speaker
adds to QUE that the speaker suspects that not p and that the speaker
believed before that p is true.




In this connection a note should be made on the use of particles. In
some cases a particle indicates how the proposition should be interpreted
in a certain universe of discourse (so-called sentence particles; see van
de Auwera 8t Vandeweghe (1984)); in other cases a particle focusses
on certain aspects of the proposition (focus particles). In this section
we concentrated on the first, i.e. on particles that concern the whole
proposition. Focus particles change the proposition and one has to take
the logical form of the proposition into account to obtain the result of the
bA more extensive treatment of temporal aspects is desirable, but this is beyond the scope
of thís paper.
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added particle. For instance. `too' in "John is drunk too" may indicate
that, besides John, there is someone else who is drunk. In this case the
particle does not influence the attitude towards the proposition but the
proposition itself, and it would therefore be incorrect to place it in the
communicative function.
6.5 Communicative effects and the influence of con-
text
In the previous section we have linked the utterance features to a
speaker's mental state by means of default rules and with that, we have
indirectly defined the felicity conditions that should be fulfilled to per-
form a particular linguistic act. From the observation of the act a recip-
ient is able to determine these conditions. So far, however, nothing has
been said about the infíuence of contextual information and the commu-
nicative effects on the mental states of both dialogue partners after the
performance of the act. In describing these effects we will use Perrault's
`observability' axiom, so that communication is explicitly built into the
axioms.
6.5.1 The addition of time
The introduction of temporal aspects in the observability axiom is in-
evitable, since the omission would lead to unintentional blocking of cer-
tain default consequents. Suppose, for instance, that the two agents S
and H mutually observe themselves and each other and that S utters a
simple declarative. If time were not built in, this would result, among
other inferences, in the following:
(23) DOSOBS(H)BcDOHOBS(S) -~ BHDO,OBS(H)dc
BSDOHOBS(S)
(24) DOS(c dec, nil, nil, p~)BLDOsOBS(S) -~
BSDOS(G dec, nil, nil, p~)
From the consequent of (24) and the second conjunct of the consequent
of (23) it can be inferred by default that BSBHp.9 From the consequent
'In the derivation the `belief transfer' rule is applied.
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of (24) it can also be ínferred that BSISBHp. Now the default rule of
`quantity' commits us to the default inference that if the speaker intends
to let the hearer believe that p is true (IsByp), the speaker believes that
the hearer does not believe that p is true (Bs~BXp), which is inconsis-
tent with the inference that the speaker believes that the hearer believes
that p is true (BsBHp). Because of the inconsistency some of the default
inferences will be blocked, although intuitively both inferences are true,
except that `Bs~Byp' comes before the performance of the communica-
tive act and `BSBHp' after. In other words, contezt has changed and
therefore the previous and the new state should be carefully separated.
Temporal aspects were already built into Perrault's framework by
adding time indices to the formulas. Here, the inclusion of time-
dependent states commits us to adjustments of the FCs, since agents
behave rationally (and therefore believe in causality) and they do not
intend to achieve states which they believe are impossible to achieve
(Bratman (1989)). Hence, agents do not believe that the effects of their
acts will appear before the acts have been performed.
Here, time to is defined as the time point just before the communica-
tive act and tl is the point just after the act.lo DOx,toa means that z
started to perform act a at time to and finished the act at time tl. So,
the length of the interval between to and tl depends on the duration of
the communicative act. In the case of a declarative with content p, the
speaker does not intend that the hearer believes p before the act is fin-
ished, i.e. before time tl. Also, in case of an interrogative, it can never
be the intention of the speaker to believe p before t2, since the hearer can
only give the answer after time tl. This results in the following adjust-
ments of the felicity conditions of the simple declarative and the simple
interrogative:
declarative: FCd,co(p) - Is,c„Bx,c,P
interrogative: FC1,t„(p) - Is,c~,BH,c,Is,c„Bs,r,p
By means of the `observability' axiom, it can be inferred that, if a speaker
performs act CA at time to and is observed by the hearer, the hearer
believes that the speaker did so:
"'It should be streased, however, that the time indices in our framework are primarily meant
to distinguiah different states and are far from sufficient to describe precisely the temporal
structure of the actiona and the resulting effects as they take place during a dialogue.
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(25) DOs,t~(CA)BcDOH,t„OBS(S) --~ BH,t,DOs,co(CA)
By means of the closure rule for defaults it can be inferred from the
consequence of (25) that the hearer believes (by default) at time tl that
the felicity conditions were fulfilled at time to: BH,t,FCcA,co(p). If mutual
observability is assumed the extension contains, among other inferences,
the mutual belief by S and H at time tl that the felicity conditions hold:
~LIBy,H,c,FCcA,c„(p). ( See Perrault ( 1989) for a more extensive discussion
on how these inferences are derived.)
6.5.2 The influence of contextual knowledge
In this subsection we will concentrate on an example where a simple
declarative is interpreted as a question under the influence of contextual
features.
In Beun (1988a) it was discussed that (26) is an important consider-
ation in determining whether a declarative utterance U was used as a
question.
(26) MBS,HEzpertN(topic(U))
That is, it is mutually believed by speaker S and hearer H that H is the
expert on the topic of the utterance. It was experimentally verified that
utterances which fulfill these conditions (like "You want to go by plane"
or "You know what time it is") are usually interpreted as questions. A
precise definition of the notions `expert' and `topic' was omitted and
will also be left out in this paper. One can imagine, however, a natural
language machine which has to supply information about arrival times of
aircraft, which is instructed that it is mutually believed that the machine
is the expert about its data base, and where the topic of the data base
is the arrival times of aircraft.
The following axiom expresses that if a speaker performs a simple
declarative and it is mutually believed that the hearer is the expert on the
propositional content p of the declarative,ll then it is not the intention
of the speaker that the hearer believes that p is true.
11For reasons of simplicity, we will assume that the hearer is the expert on the content p of
the utterance U, and not, as indicated in (26~,the expert on the topic of U.
Context-change and communicative acts 115
(27~ MBs,H,c~EzpertH(topic(p))dcDOs,t„(G dec,nil, nil,p ~) -~
~IS~toBH,tip
Now, suppose that it is initially believed that S and H observe each other
and that the hearer believes that it is mutually believed that the hearer
is the expert on the proposition p(the first conjunct of (27)). If a speaker
utters a simple declarative with content p(the second conjunct of (27)),
it can be inferred that the speaker does not intend the hearer to believe
that p is true (the consequence of (27)). Since the default consequent
of (28) will be rejected, a less preferred interpretation will be chosen,
namely the verification interpretation in (29):
(28) DOs,t„(G dec, nil, nil, p~) ~ Is,t„By,t,p
(29) DOs,t~(G dec, nil, nil, p 1)dc -~Is,t„Bx,t,p ~
Is,c„Bx,t, (Is,t~ Bs,tzpBLW Bs,wP)
6.6 Discussion
The main problem to be solved in this paper was to find a formalism for
describing how linguistic features of utterances could transfer informa-
tion about a speaker's mental state to a recipient. Therefore an utterance
was taken as a communicative act which figures in a framework of default
rules. In line with Bunt (1989a) the communicative act was defined as
the application of a communicative function to a propositional content.
The communicative function consisted of those features that contributed
to revealing a speaker's attitudes towards the content of the utterance.
Bunt's theory and the one presented in this paper are aimed at different
problems, though.
Our view concerns an identification problem; Bunt attempts to de-
fine communicative acts as changes in the mental state of both speaker
and hearer and formalizes the act as a function from context to context,
in terms of the felicity conditions of the act and the update function.
In this paper, the communicative act is denoted by an utterance with
certain features (and propositional content). The felicity conditions fol-
low by default from the utterance and, from this, a hearer can infer the
attitudes which are responsible for the performance of the CA. Bunt's
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update function would follow from the closure of the axioms and default
rules. Note that both views can lead to the same inferences, since in
both cases it was derived that the agents mutually believe that the fe-
licity conditions hold. In our case this is explicitly achieved by means of
the observability axiom.
The framework presented here differs slightly from Perrault (1989) too.
Perrault's default rules on intention explicitly state that actions are per-
formed intentionally (30) and that if the utterance of a simple declarative
is performed intentionally, the speaker believes the content of the utter-
ance (31):
(30) DOs,ca ~ Is,cDOs,ca
(31) Is ~DOs,t(G dec, nil, nil, p~) ~ Bs,tp
In our case, however, from uttering a declarative it can be inferred that
the speaker had the intention that the hearer would believe that p is
true (32) and from the quality maxim the speaker's belief that p can be
derived (33):
(32) DOs,c(C dec, nil, nil, p~) ~ Is,cBx,ctip
(33) Is,cBtr,ctip ~ Bs,cp
The difference, we think, comes mainly from a different view on the in-
tention operator. In this paper, the operator expresses a certain state
the speaker wants to achieve: "The speaker intends to make p true".
From the decision by the speaker that a certain state should be reached
it follows that the speaker is committed to do certain actions, and ev-
ery action poses its own problems. For instance, if the speaker intends
the hearer to believe that p is true, the speaker may decide to perform
intentionally a declarative with content p. This commits the speaker to
formulate a certain sentence and to do so a speaker should pick up a pen
or open his mouth, etc. In other words, a great deal of intended, parallel
and sequential actions are involved to achieve the primary intention.
In this paper, we also left out Perrault's closure rule for intention, i.e:
(34) I~,tp~B~,c(p ~ 4) ~ I~,t9
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The reason for this is given in Cohen dc Levesque (1989a): an agent who
decides to get his tooth filled and believes that the dentist's action will
cause pain, may surely deny that he intenda to be in a state of having
pain. In other words, the agent need not intend allthe expected side-
effects of his intentions. In our proposal, we have opted for a weaker form
of the consequence (i.e., ~Iz,~~q), and from this it follows that intentions
are always consistent.
The advantage usíng a non-monotonic system is that inferences can be
drawn without complete knowledge of the actual state of affairs. Here,
the particular choice of the non-monotonic system (Reiter's (1980) de-
fault logic) is rather arbitrary; one might as well choose other systems
like Moore's (1985) autoepestemic logic or Appelt and Konolige's (1988)
hierarchic autoepistemic logic. The latter is more complex and probably
too powerful for our case, since non-monotonic rules like P(a) ~~F(a)
and B(a) ~ F(a) can be given difFerent priorities, which is impossible
in our framework and which seems unnecessary. In our proposal, pri-
ority is achieved by means of a dependency between the consequent of
the preferred rule and the prerequisite of a less preferred rule and thus
explicitly built into the rules themselves. In Appelt 8c Konolige's system
the hierarchy is stipulated outside the rules.
In some cases, building in rules of priority can be problematic. Here,
we have decided to give priority to the direct use of declaratives and
interrogatives as statements and questions, respectively, but one should
be aware that in different situations different priorities could be in force.
Ambiguities, on the other hand, can simply be incorporated as disjunc-
tions into the consequents of the default rules. Later on, one might hope.
the disjuncts can be disambiguated if more knowledge becomes available
in the course of the dialogue. It is unacceptable, however, for a system to
generate a question interpretation of a declarative on the same level as
a statement interpretation simply because both interpretations are pos-
sible. Therefore, we have avoided ambiguity by the priority of certain
default rules. An advantage is that not all interpretations have to be
calculated before one is selected.
This brings us to another subject, namely the use of indirections. Usu-
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ally, indirect speech acts are inferred from the direct one and added to
the direct one. For example, a declarative question has the direct force
of a statement and the indirect force of a question. The literal force
hypothesis (LFH) (see Gazdar (1981)) is fully based on the use of ex-
plicit performatives and sentence type, as if no other sentence feature,
such as particles and intonation, would influence the determination of a
speech act type. Our theory can be considered as an extended version of
the literal force hypothesis, except that the literal force is not calculated
whenever evidence exists to the contrary. Note also that if in the case
of LFH a statement is counted as a direct interpretation with a question
as an indirect interpretation, both interpretations could lead to contra-
dictory results if they were treated `on the same level'. For instance, on
the basis of ISBHp we may infer that the speaker believes that p; on the
basis of ISBHISBsp, however, we may infer that the speaker does not
believe that p.
As we have seen, contextual knowledge may influence the choice of a
certain interpretation. In our theory a declarative was interpreted by the
hearer as a question because speaker and hearer mutually believed that
the hearer was the expert on the topic, although no information about
the question function was available in the utterance itself. This agrees
nicely with the results obtained from our experimental and empirical
studies of natural dialogues (Beun (1988b) and Beun (1989)) where 50~
of the declarative questions have no overt question indicator.
Another result to be mentioned is that the difFerence between illocu-
tionary and perlocutionary effects becomes indistinct. Levinson (1983)
describes illocutionary acts as "what is directly achieved by the conven-
tional force associated with the issuance of a certain kind of utterance in
accord with a conventional procedure. In contrast, a perlocutionary act is
specific to the circumstances of issuance ... and includes all those effects
that some particular utterance in some particular situation may cause"
(pp. 237). Here the illocutionary act is replaced by uttering a sentence
with particular characteristics, and disconnected from the performative
verbs. Both the illocutionary act and the utterance of a sentence with
particular characteristics can only be performed if a speaker fulfills cer-
tain conditions. Hence, the performance of an illocutionary act is also
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specific to the circumstances of the utterance, just as perlocutionary acts
are. Clearly, an illocutionary act should be described from a speaker's
point of view. Recognition of the act by the recipient in terms of per-
formative verbs is unnecessary for determining the relevant aspects of
the speaker's mental state. A recipient has to know how the utterance
features can be related to a package of felicity conditions. Since all ef-
fects are contextually dependent on what the hearer thinks about the
world, about the speaker, and so on, it can be argued that all effects are
perlocutionary.
6.7 Conclusion
In this paper, the performance of an utterance is taken as a communica-
tive act to influence certain aspects of the mental state of a hearer. To
describe the effects that result from the act, communicative acts were ex-
pressed in terms of the linguistic features of the utterance and, by means
of default rules, directly connected to the felicity conditions of the act.
The felicity conditions were expressed in terms of the speaker's intentions
and beliefs that must be present before the act can be performed. Suc-
cessful communication is accomplished if a hearer recognizes the felicity
conditions from the speaker's act, which occurs when the hearer observes
the speaker and knows the conventional relation between the utterance
features and its felicity conditions.
Default rules were used to build in contextual dependency of the inter-
pretation of the act and to let the agent draw inferences without complete
knowledge of the situation. To indicate that a particular interpretation
of a communicative act has a preference in most situations, default rules
were hierarchically ordered.
To simplify the felicity conditions that are transferred by a particular
communicative act, aspects of rationality and cooperation were axioma-
tized in terms of beliefs and intentions of an agent. Pragmatic principles,
such as the Gricean maxim of quality, were expressed in default rules, so
that contextual dependency could be incorporated.
An advantage of our approach is that speech acts can be viewed as
actions in general, intentionally performed with the aim of changing a
certain state (here, the mental state of the dialogue participants). In
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this respect, the agent's intentions may be viewed as his commitment to
achieve another state by performing a particular action.
There is still a great deal to be done, however. Some of the axioms
are oversimplified and in most cases particles and intonation can hardly
be interpreted in matters of belief and intention only. Also, the addi-
tion of temporal or sequential aspects cannot be avoided in a framework
of actions. The most important problem to be solved, we think, is the
determination of the primary intention of the speaker, since in the for-
malism this intention is hidden in an infinite amount of intentions and
beliefs that result from the closure of the axioms and default rules. Here,
the introduction of a plan-based analysis cannot be avoided.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
The central goal in this thesis was to understand how a declarative can
be recognized to have a question function and to identify the informa-
tion that is communicated by a declarative question (DQ~. Let us first
summarize the main results and subsequently indicate some limitations
of the research.
7.1 Main findings
In spoken information dialogues, almost 20q of the questions is uttered
with a declarative sentence type instead of an interrogative one. To in-
dicate the question function of the declarative, a speaker may add two
types of indicators to the utterance: prosodic and textual indicators. An
important prosodic indicator is a rise in intonation at the end of the
utterance. However, since only half of the DQs possesses a rising intona-
tion, the indicator is insufficient to identify all DQs. If a rising intonation
is absent, the indicators may come from textual characteristics. Textual
question indicators can be divided into two categories:
1. indicators determining that the hearer is the expert on the topic of the
utterance.
2. indicators expressing conflicting beliefs between the hearer and
speaker, and~or surprise on the part of the speaker about the proposi-
tion involved.
Although these indicators may provide strong evidence that the declar-
ative is a question, none is decisive. In all cases the indicators can be
overruled by the circumstances of the utterance.
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In using a declarative as a question, speakers often indicate that they
have a supposition or weak belief about the content of the utterance.
This belief may emanate from the discourse itself, from contextual in-
formation outside the dialogue, or both. A declarative form is preferred
if the information about the content has been literally provided in the
dialogue or if the information can be derived by implication; preference
decreases if the information is derivable from conversational principles.
An interrogative form is preferred if no information about the content is
provided in the preceding discourse. The use of declaratives correlates
with the certainty of the speaker about the content, although it cannot
be concluded that a strong supposition automatically causes a declara-
tive form and a weak or no supposition an interrogative form. The use
of declaratives decreases when topical shifts or changes occur; moreover,
for reasons of politeness it happens that a declarative is used even when
there is hardly any evidence about the content.
We have argued that a DQ without prosodic and textual question
indicators does not have to be interpreted as an indirect use of a state-
ment, but rather as a choice for a less preferred interpretation induced by
contextual knowledge. Beliefs and intentions of the speaker were derived
directly from the linguistic features of the utterance and not through the
determination of an illocutionary force.
7.2 Limitations and future research
Prosodics
Our data used in the experiments in chapter 3 were limited to utterances
without a final rise. Although a final rise in Dutch strongly indicates the
question function of a declarative, it is still indefinite whether it is suffi-
cient to conclude that the declarative is used as a question. Geluykens
(1987) already showed that English utterances in isolation with a final
rise are not always interpreted as questions. A major problem in his
results is, however, that he used intonation patterns that were synthe-
sized and we are ignorant about the correspondence of these patterns
and perceptually relevant patterns in natural dialogues. A solution to
this problem could be to investigate all utterances with a final rise in
a representative corpus of dialogues and see whether they function as
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questions. We did not investigate this systematically, but it appears in-
tuitively obvious that, apart from the DQs, other utterances occur with
a final rise. In that case, it should be investigated whether a combina-
tion of other characteristics, such as declination and accentuation, may
distinguish DQs from other utterances. Another point of investigation
might be the slope of the final rise in DQs, which is probably different
from that in other utterances. An indication that other relevant prosodic
features are present as well follows from the experimental results in chap-
ters 3 and 4. From Figure 3.2 we have concluded that a substantial part
of the utterances without textual indicators and without a rising into-
nation is interpreted as questions. In chapter 4 only a small part of the
utterances without textual indicators was identified as questions (Figure
4.2). So, since contextual indicators were absent in these experiments,
other prosodic indicators than a rising intonation must be involved.
Particles
Although particles are widely used in spoken dialogues,l until recently
their semantic descriptions have almost completely been neglected by
linguists. One of the reasons was a lack of tools to account for a satisfac-
tory description (see e.g., Wierzbicka (1986)). To describe the semantics
of the particles in this thesis, we haved used a framework of belief and
intention, with ordered default rules to express the shift of the subjects'
preference between a statement and a question interpretation. It should
be noted, though, that our semantic descriptions are considerably lim-
ited and that we have concentrated on a few particles only. It is to be
expected that a more detailed treatment and further experiments would
explain why some of these particles support a question interpretation.
Undoubtedly, concepts like topical development, dialogue structure, dis-
tribution of knowledge, etc., should be incorporated in the analysis; also
a more sophisticated treatment of temporal aspects should be under-
taken. For instance, it was found that sentences with particles that ex-
press conflicting beliefs are more often interpreted as questions. If agents
act rationally and cooperatively, then they will avoid contradictions and
conflicts, and try to determine the reason for contradicting propositions
'In contrast with other languages such as Dutch, German and Russian, the role of particlea
in English is rather modest.
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in order to solve a conflict. Hence, conflicting beliefs evoke `special' re-
sponses and therefore the particles under consideration may have a more
question-like interpretation.
The type of dialogue
Another restriction is that we have concentrated on a small part of lan-
guage use: the use of utterances in Dutch informative telephone dia-
logues. The restriction to information dialogues prevents us from mod-
elling, for instance, social status or emotion, and the restriction to tele-
phone dialogues excludes non-verbal aspects of communication. It is to
be expected that, in face to face dialogues, gesticulation, facial expres-
sions, and eye and body movement will play an important role in the
identification of intentions and beliefs. We have avoided this for obvious
reasons; the multimodal aspect would have increased the complexity of
the dialogue dramatically. Moreover, it is not likely that computers will
be able to perceive and recognize such behaviour in the near future.
The function of declarative questions
In this thesis it was found that speakers often use a declarative for ques-
tioning if they have a weak belief about the content. But, if a speaker
wants to know the answer, why then does he also want to express such
a belief? In other words, what effect do speakers want to have on the
hearer's mental state by expressing their weak belief? In chapter 5, it
was found that DQ's are often used when the information is literally
provided in the dialogue or can be derived by implication or implicature
from one or more previous utterances. This implies that the speaker is
aware that the hearer knows that the speaker has evidence about the
content of the DQ. So, if speakers do not express this evidence, they give
the impression that relevant parts of the discourse were not well under-
stood. Note also that in normal circumstances it is considered inattentive
to repeat the same question in an interrogative form if the question was
already answered. So, although it was argued that the Gricean maxim
of quantity was exploited by using a DQ (e.g., chapter 5: `the hearer
already knows the content of the utterance'), the maxim seems to be
adhered to at some deeper level to prevent the hearer from thinking that
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certain parts of the discourse were misunderstood. In this respect, the
DQ seems to fulfill the control function of an acknowledgement.
7.3 Concluding remarks
In this thesis we have used empirical and experimental results to sup-
port a better understanding of certain speech acts. With that, we have
attempted to contribute to a more integrative theory of natural lan-
guage understanding based on an analysis of what people actually do in
conversations and on results from philosophically and computationally
oriented traditions. It is our opinion that conversational analysis and
speech act theory should be seen as supplementary rather than compet-
ing approaches to discourse processing. To make accurate observations
possible, we also believe that the two disciplines cannot do without con-
trolled experiments; in this respect, our experimental results may be
conceived as an intermediary between the two approaches.
We do not believe that a well-founded semantic description of illo-
cutionary acts constitutes a goal in language understanding. This is
motivated by the results from chapter 6 where linguistic characteristics
of the utterance were mapped directly on an intentional framework, and
where illocutionary categorization was omitted because it was superflu-
ous. As far as conversational structure is concerned, it is our opinion
that speech act theory mainly contributes to the idea that language use
can be conceived as the performance of actions, and therefore should be
considered part of a more general theory of planning and acting.
Clearly, a lot remains to be done. For instance, in the theoretical
framework sketched in chapter 6, the conception of time as subsequent
states precludes the representation of cont.inuous and parallel events.
Also, the framework does not explain why people are committed to
achieve a certain state, and also we are unable to express the strength
of the agent's commitment and belief.z It is readily agreed that such
aspects should be included in a model of natural language understand-
ing, but this would have far-reaching consequences from a formal and
computational point of view.
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This thesis presents a study concerning the identification in dialogues of
questions with a declarative sentence type (DQs). The type of dialogue
is restricted to information dialogues, i.e. dialogues with the sole purpose
of transferring factual information.
In chapter 2 a general introduction is given on the identification of
communicative acts and speech acts in particular. Speech acts are con-
sidered as a special instance of communicative acts, namely those acts
that are intentionally meant to transfer certain linguistic information.
In previous experiments telephone dialogues were recorded between
an informant from Amsterdam airport and an information seeker. It
was found that almost 20q of the questions possessed the syntactic form
of a declarative. Half of these utterances had a rising intonation in the
end as a question indicator.
To recover other (prosodic or textual) indicators in the utterances
three experiments were carried out in which subjects had to determine
the question function from utterances in isolation. In chapter 3, two
experiments are described where the utterances were presented on tape;
in chapter 4, an experiment is described where the utterances were pre-
sented on screen.
The first experiment described in chapter 3 was an exploratory inves-
tigation to find out the main question indicators in spoken DQs. DQs
and answers were isolated from the original dialogues and presented to
the subjects on tape. The subjects' task was divided into two parts:
in one part they had to indicate whether the utterance was a question
or not, in the other they had to indicate whether the utterance was an
answer or not. It was found that subjects mainly indicated a question
function when the utterance contained particles such as en (and), dus
(so) and ook (also). The second experiment was carried out to verify
whether these particles or (unknown) prosodic features contributed to
a question interpretation. Potential linguistic indicators were removed
from the utterances which were presented to the subjects together with
the original utterances. The task of the subjects was identical to the
first experiment. As a result, it followed that the removal of the parti-
cles en and oh at the beginning of the utterance, and the particle dus
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significantly influenced the responses of the subjects. Utterances that
contained these particles were more often interpreted as questions than
utterances without.
A shortcoming was that the removal of linguistic indicators had the
consequence of cutting out both textual and prosodic aspects. To elim-
inate prosodic characteristics and to concentrate on textual indicators
only, an experiment is described in chapter 4 where subjects had to in-
dicate the question function from utterances presented on screen. The
task of the subjects was identical with the task in the previous experi-
ments. It was found that two types of indicators were important in the
interpretation of a declarative as a question. Firstly, indicators that de-
termine that the hearer is the expert on the topic of the utterance and,
secondly, indicators that express conflicting beliefs between the hearer
and the speaker and~or surprise of the speaker about a stated propo-
sition. Since, the results were similar to the results in the experiments
described in chapter 3, it seemed to be the case that, apart from a rising
intonation in the end of the utterance, prosodic indicators play only a
limited role in the recognition of a declarative as a question.
In chapter 5 it was investigated what contextual features contributed
to the use of a declarative as a syntactic form of a question instead of an
interrogative form. Two experiments were carried out in which dialogues,
taken from the earlier recorded dialogues, were presented to subjects in
printed form. In the first experiment, the preference of subjects was
tested for a declarative form or an interrogative one. In the second
experiment, subjects had to indicate the degree of certainty of the speaker
about the proposition stated in the declarative. Information with respect
to the semantic content of the utterance was built into the dialogues in
three ways: 1. the information was literally provided in the previous
discourse or could be derived by implication from previous utterances, 2.
information could be derived from the Gricean principle of cooperation,
and 3. the information was not available or could only be derived from
already existing world knowledge. It was found that the use of declarative
questions was high in the first case and decreased in the second and the
third. The same result was found for the certainty about the content of
the declarative. Moreover, the outcome was also influenced by an abrupt
topic change of the utterance and by rules of politeness. In most cases,
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however, where a declarative form is used for questioning, a speaker
wants to express a weak belief about the content of the declarative and
uses this form to verif,y a certain statement. It is discussed that in some
cases the inference to derive a certain belief is complex, but this is of no
concern to the hearer. A hearer has to identify only the question function
of the declarative and may take the belief of the speaker for granted.
In chapter 6 a theoretical framework was sketched to identify relevant
parts of a speaker's mental state, in terms of beliefs and intentions, from
the linguistic features of the utterance. For that, communicative acts
were considered as functions that change one context into another and
were expressed in observable features of the utterance, such as `declara-
tive', `rising intonation', etc. The features of the utterance were directly
linked to the necessary conditions (felicity conditions) to perform a cer-
tain act. This connection was accomplished by means of default rules,
which were hierarchically ordered. The introduction of default rules of-
fered a possibility to include contextual dependency without knowing all
the facts. Moreover, by means of the hierarchical order certain indirect
speech acts can be considered as a choice for a less preferred set of felic-
ity conditions and other, more preferred sets, can be rejected beforehand
on contextual grounds. The framework opens up a possibility to inter-
pret declaratives, without any other indicators, as questions instead of
statements. In those cases, evidence must be found that the statement
interpretation conflicts with previous contextual knowledge; for instance,
when the hearer knows that it is mutually known that the hearer is the
expert on the topic of the utterance. The theoretical framework was
developed in such a way that many of the results from the experiments
could be incorporated qualitatively.
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Samenvatting
In dit proefschrift wordt de herkenning behandeld van vragen die een
declaratief zinstype bezitten (DQs) in dialogen. Het type dialoog wordt
hierbij beperkt tot zogenaamde `informatie dialogen', dat zijn dialogen
waarbij de gesprekspartners slechts als doel hebben feitelijke informatie
over te dragen.
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een algemene introductie over de herkenning van
communicatieve handelingen in het algemeen en taalhandelingen in het
bijzonder. Taalhandelingen worden hierbij beschouwd als communi-
catieve handelingen waarbij de spreker intentioneel probeert bepaalde
informatie over te dragen met behulp van linguïstische middelen.
In eerder uitgevoerde experimenten zijn telefonische dialogen
opgenomen tussen een informatrice van Schiphol en een informatie-
opvrager. Hierbij bleek dat bijna 20~ van de vragen een declaratief
zinstype bezat en dat slechts in de helft van deze gevallen de vraagfunc-
tie werd aangegeven door een finale stijging in de intonatie.
Om andere indicatoren in de uiting te achterhalen (zowel prosodisch
als textueel) zijn een drietal experimenten uitgevoerd waarbij de proef-
personen de vraagfunctie moesten bepalen van een aantal declaratieve
uitingen in isolatie. In hoofdstuk 3 zijn twee experimenten uitgevoerd
waarbij de uitingen op band werden aangeboden; in hoofdstuk 4 werden
de uitingen op beeldscherm gepresenteerd.
Het eerste experiment in hoofdstuk 3 was een verkennend onderzoek
om de belangrijkste indicatoren in gesproken DQs vast te stellen. Hier-
bij waren zowel DQs als antwoorden geïsoleerd uit de eerder opgenomen
dialogen en op band aangeboden aan de proefpersonen. De opdracht
van de proefpersonen bestond uit twee delen: in een deel moesten de
proefpersonen aangeven of de uiting een vraag was of niet, in het an-
dere deel of de uiting een antwoord was of niet. Partikels als en aan het
begin van de uiting, en dus en ook leken hierbij belangrijke indicatoren
te zijn voor de vraagfunctie. In een tweede experiment is geverifiëerd of
de bijdrage aan de vraagfunctie daadwerkelijk van deze partikels afkom-
stig was of dat misschien tot dan toe onbekende prosodische factoren
een rol zouden spelen. Daartoe werden textuele eigenschappen die een
mogelijke bijdrage konden leveren aan de vraagfunctie verwijderd van de
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uiting en de nieuw verkregen uitingen werden tesamen aangeboden met
de originele uitingen. De proefpersonen hadden dezelfde opdracht als in
het voorafgaande experiment. In dit geval bleek dat het verwijderen van
de partikels en en oh aan het begin van de uiting, en het partikel dus
de responsies van de proefpersonen significant beïnvloedden. Uitingen
die deze partikels bevatten werden meer als vragen geïnterpreteerd dan
uitingen zonder deze partikels.
Een tekortkoming van het laatstgenoemde experiment was dat door
het verwijderen van de textuele indicatoren wellicht eveneens prosodi-
sche indicatoren werden verwijderd. Om de invloed van prosodische as-
pecten na te gaan is een experiment uitgevoerd in hoofdstuk 4, waarbij
de proefpersonen de vraagfunctie moesten aangeven van uitingen die op
een beeldscherm waren gepresenteerd. In dit geval werden twee belang-
rijke types indicatoren gevonden die bijdroegen aan de interpretatie van
de uiting als vraag. Ten eerste, indicatoren die bepalen dat een hoorder
expert is over het onderwerp van de uiting en, ten tweede, indicatoren
die conflicten aangeven tussen de kennis van de spreker en de hoorder
en~of verbazing uitdrukken van de spreker over een bepaalde propositie.
Verder kwamen de verkregen resultaten sterk overeen met de resultaten
van de experimenten uít hoofdstuk 3.
In hoofdstuk 5 is onderzocht in hoeverre contextuele factoren een bi-
jdrage leveren aan het gebruik van een declaratief i.p.v. een interro-
gatief als syntactische eigenschap van een vraag. Hiervoor zijn twee
experimenten uitgevoerd waarbij aan proefpersonen relatief korte dialo-
gen op papier werden aangeboden. In het eerste experiment moesten
de proefpersonen aangeven welke vorm oorspronkelijk in de dialoog was
gebruikt voor het stellen van een vraag: een declaratieve of een inter-
rogatieve vorm. In het tweede experiment moesten de proefpersonen
schattingen maken van de graad van zekerheid van de spreker omtrent
de propositie die uitgedrukt werd in de declaratief. Daartoe werd in-
formatie met betrekking tot de semantische inhoud van de uiting op
drie verschillende manieren in de dialoog ingebouwd: 1. de informatie
werd letterlijk in de voorafgaande tekst vermeld of kon m.b.v. impli-
catie worden afgeleid, 2. de informatie kon worden afgeleid m.b.v. het
Griceaanse codperatie-principe en 3. de informatie was niet beschikbaar
in de voorafgaande tekst, maar kon hooguit afgeleid worden m.b.v. reeds
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bestaande wereldkennis. Zowel het gebruik van declaratieven als de ze-
kerheid omtrent de inhoud van de uiting was hoog in het eerste geval en
daalde in de daaropvolgende gevallen. De resultaten van het experiment
werden bovendien beïnvloed door een eventuele onderwerpswisseling in
het gesprek en bepaalde beleefdheidsregels. In de meeste gevallen werd
een declaratieve vorm voor het stellen van een vraag echter gebruikt om
een vermoeden uit te drukken betreffende de inhoud van uiting; de vraag
krijgt hierdoor de functie van een verificatie. De inferenties om tot een
vermoeden te komen zijn dikwijls bijzonder ingewikkeld, hetgeen echter
niet van belang is voor de herkenning van de declaratief als vraag. Een
hoorder hoeft slechts de vraagfunctie van de declaratief te identificeren
en wanneer dit eenmaal is gelukt kan direct uit de vorm afgeleid worden
dat de spreker een vermoeden heeft over de inhoud.
In hoofdstuk 6 is een theoretisch kader ontwikkeld waarbij het mo-
gelijk is relevante delen van de mentale toestand van een spreker (uitge-
drukt in termen van kennis en~of intenties van de spreker~ te identi-
ficeren aan de hand van de linguïstische eigenschappen van de uiting.
Communicatieve handelingen worden hierbij beschouwd als functies die
een bepaalde context kunnen veranderen in een andere context en wor-
den uitgedrukt in waarneembare eigenschappen van de uiting, zoals
`declaratief', `finale stijging', etc. De eigenschappen van de uiting zijn
hierbij door middel van defaultregels verbonden met de geschiktheids-
voorwaarden voor de uitvoering van een bepaalde handeling. De intro-
ductie van defaultregels maakt het mogelijk contextuele afhankelijkheid
te introduceren zonder dat alle feiten over de context bekend hoeven te
zijn. Verder zijn de defaults zodanig ontworpen dat een volgorde aan-
wezig was in een aantal verschillende regels. Dit stelt ons in staat om de
interpretatie van bepaalde indírecte taalhandelingen te beschouwen als
een keuze voor een andere verzameling geschiktheidsvoorwaarden dan
die de voorkeur geniet puur op grond van de linguïstische eigenschap-
pen van de uiting. De juiste keuze kan dan gemaakt worden op grond
van contextuele eigenschappen van de uiting. Op deze manier kunnen
declaratieven louter op grond van contextuele kennis van de hoorder
geïnterpreteerd worden als vragen i.p.v. beweringen. Zo'n geval doet
zich bijvoorbeeld voor indien de hoorder de kennis bezit dat de spreker
en de hoorder wederzijds weten dat de hoorder expert is over het on-
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derwerp van de uiting. Het theoretisch kader is zodanig ontwikkeld dat
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